Preferences Are Public Rights by Gotberg, Brook E.
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications
Winter 2013
Preferences Are Public Rights
Brook E. Gotberg
University of Missouri School of Law, gotbergb@missouri.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/facpubs
Part of the Bankruptcy Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository.
Recommended Citation
Brook Gotberg, Preferences Are Public Rights, 2013 Wis. L. Rev. 1355 (2013).
PREFERENCES ARE PUBLIC RIGHTS
BROOK GOTBERG*
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v. Marshall, there
is widespread uncertainty as to what other proceedings may constitutionally
fall within a bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction. Supreme Court
jurisprudence has been cryptic regarding the constitutional limitations of
non-Article III courts, but the Court has identified a "public rights exception"
to the general rule that the judicial power must be exercised only by judges
with life tenure and salary protection. This public rights exception has not yet
been explicitly extended to a bankruptcy proceeding, but the reasoning of the
Court strongly suggests that a trustee's motion to avoid preferences would
fall under the public rights exception, as a proceeding stemming exclusively
from bankruptcy law and necessary to resolve claims against the estate.
Accordingly, and contrary to what most scholars have suggested, preference
proceedings fit comfortably within the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, even
after the Supreme Court's ruling in Stern.
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INTRODUCTION
Article III of the U.S. Constitution dictates that the judicial power of
the United States shall be vested in courts ordained and established by
Congress. It further requires that the judges of these courts shall be
granted life tenure and salary protection.' This straightforward
requirement was relatively uncontroversial during the first few decades
of its application. However, particularly in recent years, the implications
of Article III's reservation of judicial power have become increasingly
relevant. 2 Even as the administrative state becomes more complex-with
decisions made increasingly by specialized bodies rather than Article III
federal judges-scholars, judges, and litigants are raising concerns that
the exercise of adjudicatory powers by administrative agencies and
legislative courts is a violation of the Constitution.3
These concerns have been especially prevalent in the field of
bankruptcy law. The bankruptcy judge is a federal official appointed to
fourteen-year terms by the Circuit Court for his or her district. By virtue
of this arrangement, the bankruptcy judge falls outside Article III, and
accordingly cannot constitutionally exercise the "judicial Power of the
United States." Nonetheless, the bankruptcy judge historically has
exercised judicial authority over a broad swath of bankruptcy
proceedings, including actions between the bankruptcy trustee and
creditors of the estate.4 Until recently, the ability of a bankruptcy judge
to enter final judgment in such "core proceedings" was well established.5
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
2. See, e.g., Tyson A. Crist, Stem v. Marshall: Application of the Supreme
Court's Landmark Decision in the Lower Courts, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 627, 627-28
(2012).
3. See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the
Origins of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REv. 939,
979-80 (2011).
4. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006).
5. See, e.g., Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.),
456 B.R. 318, 320-21 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) ("For over twenty-five years, my
colleagues and I have operated with the understanding that we were properly constituted
judges capable of rendering final judgments in . . . so-called 'core proceedings.' . ..
Moreover, in exercising my delegated authority, I have entered countless orders as final
1356
2013:1355 Preferences Are Public Rights 1357
However, in the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Stern v.
Marshall,6  which concluded that bankruptcy judges could not
constitutionally enter final judgment on a debtor's counterclaims against
a creditor of the estate,7 the authority of bankruptcy judges in such
proceedings is more uncertain.8 Many are questioning whether
bankruptcy judges may issue final rulings in other proceedings, such as
motions by the trustee to avoid fraudulent or preferential transfers, or
whether those proceedings warrant de novo review by the district court at
a party's request, with a bankruptcy judge's conclusions constituting a
mere report and recommendation to the district court judge.9
The principle cause for this uncertainty is that the underlying
constitutional justification for allowing bankruptcy judges to enter final
without a second thought about the legitimacy of what I was doing. However, Stern v.
Marshall reveals how misplaced my confidence has been."). But see John C. McCoid, II,
Right to Jury Trial in Bankruptcy: Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J.
15, 40 (1991) [hereinafter McCoid, Right to Jury Trial] (indicating that "[i]t has not been
settled whether under Article III the bankruptcy court can exercise jurisdiction over core
proceedings which involve the recapture of preferences and fraudulent conveyances").
6. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
7. Id. at 2620.
8. See generally, Ralph Brubaker, A "Summary" Statutory and Constitutional
Theory of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction after Stem v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 121, 147 (2012) [hereinafter Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory] ("Stern v. Marshall
resurrects ... the long-smoldering suspicion that other portions of the statutory grant of
core jurisdiction to non-Article III bankruptcy judges are likewise unconstitutional.");
Crist, supra note 2, at 635 (noting that the Supreme Court's reasoning in Stern "seems
equally applicable to other subsections of section 157"); see also Tabor v. Kelly (In re
Davis), No. 05-15794-GWE, Adv. No. 07-05181-L, 2011 WL 5429095, at *13 (Bankr.
W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) ("Other bankruptcy judges believe that Stern is to be limited
solely to the particular core proceeding at issue there . . . . I do not agree with the
conclusion of these bankruptcy judges.").
9. See Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 180; George W.
Kuney, Stem v. Marshall: A Likely Return to the Bankruptcy Act's Summary/Plenary
Distinction in Article II1 Terms, 21 NORTON J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 1, 9 (2012). The
characterization of a bankruptcy judge's decision as a report and recommendation is
unlikely, in most situations, to change the outcome of the case, as district courts tend to
endorse such reports. See Lawrence P. King, Jurisdiction and Procedure under the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984, 38 VAND. L. REV. 675, 681-82 (1985) ("In practical
terms... the nonarticle III court's proposed findings and conclusions will be the findings
and conclusions."); Adam Lewis et al., Stem v. Marshall: A Jurisdictional Game
Changer?, 7 PRATr's J. BANKR. L. 483, 492 (2011) ("[A]s a practical matter, bankruptcy
courts may still be the ultimate decisionmakers on these issues, particularly to the extent
district courts remain overburdened, and therefore more prone to 'rubber stamping'
bankruptcy courts' conclusions."); Dan Schechter, Although Bankruptcy Courts Lack
Jurisdiction to Hear and Determine Fraudulent Transfer Claims, They May Issue Reports
and Recommendations, and Defendant May Waive Objection to Lack of Jurisdiction,
COMM. FIN. NEWSL. Dec. 6, 2012, at 100 ("The district courts will almost invariably
rubber-stamp the bankruptcy courts' 'reports and recommendations,' properly deferring
to the bankruptcy judges' acknowledged expertise in such matters.").
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orders in bankruptcy proceedings is obscure. Congress began
constructing Article I courts and providing administrative agencies with
adjudicatory power long before constitutional scholars began to question
the consistency of such organizations with Article III of the
Constitution.' ° As a consequence, the dividing line between Article I and
Article III in matters of fact finding and enforcing rules is indistinct, at
best." Over the past thirty years, since the establishment of the current
bankruptcy system, which vested significant jurisdictional authority in
non-Article III bankruptcy judges, the Supreme Court has grappled with
drawing appropriate boundaries around Article III "judicial Power."' 2 In
so doing, the Court has established multiple and often conflicting
standards that have created more uncertainty than direction.
In each case where the Court has addressed the jurisdictional
authority of bankruptcy judges, it has raised the issue of "public rights,"
a concept first identified in the mid-1800s, but notoriously vague and
largely undefined. 3 The Court has stated that public rights, as
distinguished from private rights, are "integrally related to particular
federal government action,"' 4 and "must at a minimum arise 'between
the government and others."",15 However, the Court has been reluctant to
positively identify specific bankruptcy proceedings as falling inside the
category of public rights. 16 In cases involving public rights, the Court has
reiterated time and again, final adjudication outside an Article III court is
warranted and permissible, but those charged with implementing
Supreme Court decisions in bankruptcy legislation and legal rulings are
left to surmise what actually qualifies as a public right.' 7 The Court has
identified some boundaries by excluding counterclaims by the estate
against a creditor who has filed a claim 8 and fraudulent conveyance
proceedings against a creditor who has not filed a claim 9 from the
10. See Merrill, supra note 3, at 979-80.
11. See John Harrison, The Relation between Limitations on and Requirements
of Article 11I Adjudication, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1378 (2007); Martin H. Redish,
Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 198-99.
12. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Kenneth G. Coffin, Limiting Legislative Courts:
Protecting Article Ilfrom Article I Evisceration, 16 BARRY L. REV. 1, 2 (2011).
13. See S. Todd Brown, Constitutional Gaps in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 179, 202 (2012); Coffin, supra note 12, at 5.
14. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011).
15. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982)
(quoting Ex Parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929)).
16. Murphy v. Felice (In re Felice), 480 B.R. 401, 412-13 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2012); see Crist, supra note 2, at 627-28
17. See generally Brown, supra note 13, at 202.
18. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2608.
19. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 55 (1989).
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category of public rights. Other courts have expanded on these rulings,
concluding that actions by the trustee to recover preferential transfers,
which are payments made by the debtor to a creditor in the ninety days
prior to bankruptcy, must also be outside this category such that a
bankruptcy judge may not enter a final judgment in preference
20proceedings.
The conclusion that preference proceedings, by virtue of their
similarities to fraudulent conveyance proceedings, 2' are outside the
authority of bankruptcy judges to issue final judgments is misguided. Up
to now, the justification for treating preferences like fraudulent
conveyances has focused on the cosmetic similarities between the two
types of proceedings, with little attention given to differences relevant to
the public rights/private rights distinction. Focusing on those differences,
it becomes clear that preferences, which stem exclusively from
bankruptcy law and are necessary in resolving claims against the estate,
are public rights and thus may be administered by non-Article III judges
under the public rights doctrine.
20. See Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 469
B.R. 713, 717 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012); Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No.
05-15794-GWE, Adv. No. 07-05181-L, 2011 WL 5429095, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 5, 2011). But see Zazzali v. 1031 Exch. Grp. (In re DBSI, Inc.), 467 B.R. 767,
772-73 (Bankr. D. Del. 2012) (holding that bankruptcy courts have the constitutional
authority to enter final judgments in preference proceedings); Burns v. Dennis (In re Se.
Materials, Inc.), 467 B.R. 337, 367 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2012); West v. Freedom Med., Inc.
(In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy, L.P.), 465 B.R. 452, 468 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2011).
21. This Article presumes, as the Ninth Circuit has held, that the holding in
Granfinanciera is sound and that it signifies that fraudulent conveyances are outside the
realm of public rights in both in the jury trial and Article III context. See Exec. Benefits
Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 562 (9th Cir.
2012). However, this presumption does not reflect my personal views. The ruling in
Granfinanciera, dealing with the question of jury trials, was based primarily on a
questionable understanding of the historic treatment of bankruptcy proceedings in
England. It is unclear why this history should have any bearing on the structural question
of when and whether a bankruptcy judge without life tenure should be permitted to enter
a final judgment in the United States today. See Redish, supra note 11, at 211. However,
because the Supreme Court will shortly address this issue, see In re Bellingham Ins.
Agency, Inc., 702 F.3d 553, 562 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (U.S. Apr.
3, 2013) (No. 12-1200), I limit my remarks in this Article to the question of preferences
actions under the current legal regime, and save an analysis of the advisability of the
public rights doctrine and whether it has been properly applied to fraudulent conveyance
proceedings for another day. It may be that the Supreme Court's decision in Arkison will
warrant additional commentary. In the meantime, this Article demonstrates that even
assuming fraudulent conveyances are not public rights, as the Supreme Court has stated,
see Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55, and therefore outside a bankruptcy judge's permitted
authority to issue final judgments, as the Ninth Circuit has concluded, see In re
Bellingham Ins. Agency Inc., 702 F.3d at 562, preferences are public rights and are
constitutionally within a bankruptcy judge's ability to issue final rulings.
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This paper makes the case that bankruptcy judges rightly possess
the constitutional authority to issue final rulings in preference
proceedings. Part I describes the constitutional concerns surrounding a
bankruptcy court's exercise of final adjudicatory authority. The current
structure of the bankruptcy system employs bankruptcy judges to issue
final rulings in proceedings which many have argued require the exercise
of judicial power by a judge with life tenure and salary protection:
bankruptcy judges have neither. Supreme Court decisions have left a
significant number of issues relating to bankruptcy judge jurisdiction
unexplored, creating widespread uncertainty and disagreement regarding
the appropriate scope of a bankruptcy judge's authority to issue final
determinations.
Part II explains the doctrinal exception to the requirement that
judicial proceedings be determined by Article III courts, namely, that
proceedings involving a determination of public rights may be finally
resolved by a tribunal that lacks the Article III protections. This part
traces the history and development of the public rights doctrine, which
has been treated at different times as both a bright-line rule and a
non-dispositive factor, and summarizes the current state of the law in this
area. It also defends the ongoing relevance of the public rights doctrine,
despite inconsistent historical treatment and academic criticism that the
public rights doctrine is obsolete.
Part III introduces preferences, explaining their role in bankruptcy
proceedings and comparing them with fraudulent conveyance actions. It
highlights important distinctions between the two causes of action that
are particularly relevant in the context of public rights analysis. It then
defends preference proceedings as matters of public right appropriate for
final determination before a non-Article III judge by drawing heavily on
Court opinions, most notably Stern, for standards pertinent to the public
rights exception. The most widely cited and accepted standards are that
the action at issue must stem from the bankruptcy itself or be necessarily
resolved in the course of claims determination.22 Preference actions
satisfy both standards: Congress created a preference cause of action for
the purpose of ensuring the effectiveness of the bankruptcy distributional
process, and resolution of such an action is necessary for the proper
determination of claims. In so arguing, this Part challenges the
contradictory conclusions of several established scholars and bankruptcy
courts.
22. Crist, supra note 2, at 636-37.
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I. THE PROBLEM OF CORE JURISDICTION IN BANKRUPTCY COURTS
The jurisdictional boundaries of bankruptcy courts and the
constitutional authority of bankruptcy court judges are long-debated
issues, subject to significant controversy. For purposes relevant to this
discussion, the problem first arose in the early 1970s, when Congress
determined that amendments to bankruptcy law were necessary in the
area of bankruptcy jurisdiction.23 As demonstrated below, the relevant
issues are still far from resolution, and there is significant disagreement
within the bankruptcy community as to the current status of the law and
the direction it is heading.
Prior to 1978, jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases was split between
"summary jurisdiction," exercised by non-Article III officials, and
"plenaiy jurisdiction," exercised by Article III judges or the state courts,
unless the parties consented to bankruptcy court jurisdiction.24 The
non-Article III officials who could hear and determine summary
proceedings were called bankruptcy "referees," reflecting the fact that
cases were "referred" to them by the district courts.25 Unfortunately, the
scope of summary jurisdiction was imprecise,26 with courts across the
nation issuing conflicting opinions regarding the summary or plenary
nature of, for example, counterclaims by the estate against claimants of
the estate.27 This uncertainty created fertile ground for litigation over the
jurisdictional authority of the bankruptcy referees to preside over the
proceeding at issue. As a consequence, bankruptcy scholars chafed
against the summary/plenary distinction as inefficient.2 8 The primary
complaint was that the system encouraged delay,2 9 but costs were also an
issue3-as was the perceived opportunity to forum shop.3'
23. See Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United
States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 32-33 (1995).
24. See Martin Gendel, Jurisdiction Problems in Bankruptcy Court, 44 J. NAT'L
CONF. REF. BNKit. 61, 61 (1970).
25. See Leslie R. Masterson, Waiving the Right to a Jury: Claims,
Counterclaims, and Informal Claims, 85 AM. BANKR. L.J. 91, 97 (2011).
26. See Troy A. McKenzie, Getting to the Core of Stem v. Marshall: History,
Expertise, and the Separation of Powers, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 23, 40 (2012).
27. Masterson, supra note 25, at 97.
28. See, e.g., Gendel, supra note 24, at 62.
29. See Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The
Chief Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 1, 6 (1985); Gendel, supra note 24, at 62; see also Tabb, supra note 23, at 25
(explaining the frequent nature of litigation over bankruptcy referee jurisdiction).
30. Gendel, supra note 24, at 62.
31. Id. at 62-63.
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In response to these concerns, and in recognition of the difficulties
faced by the bankruptcy referees, 32 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy
Code of 1978 ("Bankruptcy Code"), which granted bankruptcy
referees-now termed "bankruptcy judges"-all the jurisdiction that the
district court could have exercised over bankruptcy proceedings.33 Under
the new Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges would be permitted to hear
and issue final determinations in all "civil proceedings arising under...
or arising in or related to cases under [the Bankruptcy Code]. 34 There
was some talk of appointing bankruptcy judges under Article II, 3 5 but
ultimately Congress opted for bankruptcy judges who would not enjoy
life tenure or salary protection.36 This proved to be a mistake: due to
bankruptcy judges' Article I status, and even before all provisions of the
new law were to take effect, the Supreme Court struck down the new
Bankruptcy Code as unconstitutional in Northern Pipeline Construction
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.3
7
In Northern Pipeline, the debtor had filed a lawsuit against a
creditor for breach of contract and warranty in connection with a
bankruptcy petition before the bankruptcy court.38 The creditor sought
dismissal of the suit on the grounds that the Bankruptcy Code had
unconstitutionally conferred Article III powers on Article I bankruptcy
judges.39 The Supreme Court agreed.4 °
32. Senator Quentin Burdick called for hearings on amending the bankruptcy
laws in response to conversations with a friend and bankruptcy trustee, Richard Barry,
who had commented on the difficulties met by referees who attempted to operate
bankruptcy cases under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or
Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part One:
Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 6 (2007). Senator Burdick investigated by
requesting feedback from referees; the flood of responses from the referees sparked
Burdick to introduce Senate Joint Resolution 100 and establish the commission. Id.
33. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(a) (2006).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1982).
35. See Susan Block-Lieb, What Congress Had to Say: Legislative History as a
Rehearsal of Congressional Response to Stem v. Marshall, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 55,
82-83 (2012) (describing Congressional hearings on the question of Article I status for
bankruptcy judges); compare H.R. REP. No. 95-595, at 7 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5968, with S. REP. No. 95-989, at 15-16 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5801-02.
36. There is some evidence that the resistance to appointing bankruptcy judges
under Article III stemmed primarily from the federal bench itself See generally
Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress, and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 Part Three: On the Hill, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 341, 347-53
(2007).
37. 458 U.S. 50, 84 (1982).
38. Id. at 56.
39. Id. at 56-57.
40. Id. at 87.
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Citing the constitutional system of checks and balances, the Court
concluded that the congressionally appointed bankruptcy bench-which
lacked Article III protections but nonetheless wielded the "judicial power
of the United States"-constituted an "unwarranted encroachment" by
the legislative branch into the judicial branch.4 Appellants had argued
that the determinations of bankruptcy judges in bankruptcy proceedings
were within the "public rights" doctrine, as first set forth in the Supreme
Couft case In re Murray's Lessee,42 and in the alternative, that
bankruptcy courts were mere "adjuncts" of the district courts, meaning
the essential attributes of judicial power had been retained by the judicial
branch.43 The Court rejected both arguments.44 Instead, it concluded,
absent any historically recognized exceptions to the Article III
requirements, "Art[icle] III bars Congress from establishing legislative
courts to exercise jurisdiction over all matters related to those arising
under the bankruptcy laws.A'' The Court acknowledged that "when
Congress creates a statutory right, it clearly has the discretion, in
defining that right, to ... provide that persons seeking to vindicate that
right must do so before particularized tribunals created to perform the
specialized adjudicative tasks related to that right. '4 6 However, "when
the right being adjudicated is not of congressional creation"--like the
contract at issue in Northern Pipeline--Congress cannot create such a
tribunal without offending the Constitution.47
The Supreme Court stayed enforcement of its action for several
months to permit Congress to enact new legislation that would respond
to the constitutional deficiencies identified in Northern Pipeline.48 When
Congress proved unable to act within the given time period, the Judicial
Conference of the United States promulgated an "Emergency Rule"
bifurcating the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional authority between
"core" bankruptcy matters, which the drafters believed could be heard
and finally determined by bankruptcy judges even under the Northern
Pipeline ruling, and "non-core" matters, which would have to be finally
determined by the district court.49 It was hoped that in this way the basic
structure of the proposed bankruptcy courts could be preserved, while
41. Id. at 84.
42. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (In re Murray's Lessee), 59
U.S. 272, 284 (1855).
43. N Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 67, 76-77.
44. Id. at 71-72, 81-87.
45. Id. at 76.
46. Id. at 83.
47. Id. at 84.
48. Id. at 88; Block-Lieb, supra note 35, at 93; Masterson, supra note 25, at
103.
49. CHARLES JORDAN TABB, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 50 (2d ed. 2009).
2013:1355 1363
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still satisfying constitutional requirements.50 Although many doubted this
effort would succeed,51 the Emergency Rule was upheld by the courts,
codified by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 (BAFJA) 52 and continues to provide the jurisdictional structure of
the bankruptcy courts over thirty years later.53
50. See Vein Countryman, Emergency Rule Compounds Emergency, 57 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 1, 2 (1983); Jeffrey T. Ferriell, Core Proceedings in Bankruptcy Court, 56
UMKC L. REv. 47, 47 (1987).
51. See Countryman, supra note 50, at 3; Bankruptcy Reform: Hearing before
the Subcomm. on Courts of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. 19-20 (1983)
(statement of Jonathan C. Rose).
52. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No.
98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984).
53. Core proceedings are now delineated in 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (2006) as
follows:
(2) Core proceedings include, but are not limited to-
(A) matters concerning the administration of the estate;
(B) allowance or disallowance of claims against the estate or
exemptions from property of the estate, and estimation of claims or
interests for the purposes of confirming a plan under chapter 11, 12, or
13 of title 11 but not the liquidation or estimation of contingent or
unliquidated personal injury tort or wrongful death claims against the
estate for purposes of distribution in a case under title 11;
(C) counterclaims by the estate against persons filing claims against
the estate;
(D) orders in respect to obtaining credit;
(E) orders to turn over property of the estate;
(F) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences;
(G) motions to terminate, annul, or modify the automatic stay;
(H) proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover fraudulent
conveyances;
(I) determinations as to the dischargeability of particular debts;
(J) objections to discharges;
(K) determinations of the validity, extent, or priority of liens;
(L) confirmation of plans;
(M) orders approving the use or lease of property, including the use of
cash collateral;
(N) orders approving the sale of property other than property resulting
from claims brought by the estate against persons who have not filed
claims against the estate;
(0) other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the assets of the
estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security
holder relationship, except personal injury tort or wrongful death
claims; and
(P) recognition of foreign proceedings and other matters under
chapter 15 of title 11.
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However, recent case law has again raised questions regarding the
constitutionality of the bankruptcy courts' jurisdictional structure. In
2011, the case of Stern v. Marshall came before the Supreme Court,
involving another challenge to the bankruptcy judge's power to issue a
final ruling in a tort counterclaim brought by the debtor against a creditor
of the estate. 4 In a decision that surprised many,55 the Court ruled that
permitting bankruptcy judges to issue final judgments over such
counterclaims-previously identified as "core" proceedings-raised the
same constitutional issues identified in Northern Pipeline.16 Specifically,
the Court found that the bankruptcy judge, by issuing a final ruling in the
tort counterclaim, had exercised the "judicial Power of the United
States," thereby encroaching into the sphere of Article 111. 57 The Court
again rejected arguments that such a proceeding fell under the "public
rights" doctrine, 58 as well as the argument that the bankruptcy judge was
acting as an adjunct of the district court, noting that "[t]he judicial
powers the courts exercise in cases such as this remain the same [as they
were under the 1978 Act discussed in Northern Pipeline], and a court
exercising such broad powers is no mere adjunct of anyone. 59
Many academics first responding to the Stern decision described it
in calamitous terms, 60 although many others concluded, as Chief Justice
John Roberts had suggested in his opinion, that the decision "does not
54. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2601 (2011).
55. See Block-Lieb, supra note 35, at 57 ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Stern has been even more shocking to the bankruptcy bar than its earlier decision in
Northern Pipeline."); Jolene Tanner, Stem v. Marshall: The Earthquake That Hit the
Bankruptcy Courts and the Aftershocks That Followed, 45 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 587, 588
(2012) ("The Court's holding in Stern caused judges, practitioners, scholars, and litigants
to question bankruptcy judges' authority and the sanctity of the bankruptcy courts. This
decision sent shockwaves through the entire bankruptcy community.").
56. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2610-11.
57. Id. at 2611.
58. Id. at 2615 ("What is plain here is that this case involves the most
prototypical exercise of judicial power: the entry of a final, binding judgment by a court
with broad substantive jurisdiction, on a common law cause of action, when the action
neither derives from nor depends upon any agency regulatory regime. If such an exercise
of judicial power may nonetheless be taken from the Article III Judiciary simply by
deeming it part of some amorphous 'public right,' then Article I1 would be transformed
from the guardian of individual liberty and separation of powers we have long recognized
into mere wishful thinking.").
59. Id. at 2611.
60. See, e.g., MARK S. SCARBERRY ET AL., BUSINESS REORGANIZATION IN
BANKRUPTCY: CASES AND MATERIALS 91 (4th ed. 2012); Kuney, supra note 9, at 1; see
also Meoli v. Huntington Nat' Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318,
322-23 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) ("[B]ombshell is an exaggeration if surprise alone is
to be the measure.... However, bombshell does fairly describe Stern's impact upon the
more practical issue of how bankruptcy judges are to perform what the [Bankruptcy]
Code still calls us to do.").
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change all that much., 61 Certainly, the case meant that bankruptcy judges
could no longer issue final decisions in proceedings involving
counterclaims by the estate against an objecting creditor, but many
argued that the holding could be largely contained to this fact pattern.62
In cases where the creditor did not object, for example, commentators
suggested that the bankruptcy court could still issue the final
determination;63  in other words, consent could overcome the
constitutional infirmity identified in Stern. To this end, members of the
Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules have proposed rule-making
responses to Stern that would require an explicit statement of consent as
to all non-core proceedings,64 including proceedings such as that raised
in Stern that have been unconstitutionally included in the core category.
However, not all are convinced that consent can serve as the
solution to the constitutional issue presented in Stern,65 and thus far the
courts are divided.66 The development of case law after Stern has also
61. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620.
62. See, e.g., Menotte v. United States (In re Custom Contractors, LLC), 462
BR. 901, 905-08 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); Tibble v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (In re
Hudson), 455 B.R. 648, 656-57 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011); In re Salander O'Reilly
Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 116-17 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011);
63. See, e.g., Ralph Brubaker, Article III's Bleak House (Part II): The
Constitutional Limits of Bankruptcy Judges' Core Jurisdiction, 31 BANKR. L. LETTER No.
9, Sept. 2011, at 19 [hereinafter Brubaker, Bleak House].
64. Memorandum to Advisory Comm. on Bankr. Rules from Subcomm. on
Bus. Issues (Mar. 15, 2012), in ADDENDUM TO AGENDA MATERIALS FOR THE MEETING OF
THE ADVISORY COMM. ON BANKR. RULES 57-58 (2012), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/bankruptcy/2012-
03-BKAddendum.pdf
65. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Formalism without a Foundation: Stem v.
Marshall, 2011 Sup. CT. REv. 183, 211 ("The argument is that there are two kinds of
restrictions on the authority imposed by Article III: lack of subject matter jurisdiction and
lack of power to issue a final judgment; consent cannot cure the former, but can solve the
latter. But there is no apparent basis for this distinction."); Schechter, supra note 9, at 100
("I wish that the [Ninth Circuit in In re Bellingham] were right, but I don't think that the
bankruptcy court's lack of subject matter jurisdiction can be waived under Stern v.
Marshall .. "). But see Crist, supra note 2, at 640-41 (arguing that Stern has nothing to
do with subject matter jurisdiction).
66. Compare Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins.
Agency, Inc.), 702 F.3d 553, 566-67 (9th Cir. 2012) (concluding that consent permits a
non-Article III judge to issue final judgments in non-core proceedings, and holding that
the creditor in this case had consented), with Waldman v. Stone, 698 F.3d 910, 918 (6th
Cir. 2012) (finding the constitutional system of checks and balances to be a non-waivable
structural principle, and accordingly overturning the bankruptcy judge's issuance of a
final ruling despite the creditor's initial failure to object). See also In re BearingPoint,
Inc., 453 B.R. 486, 497 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (arguing that in the face of Stern "it may
now be, and it's fair to assume that it will now be argued, that consent, no matter how
uncoerced and unequivocal, will never again be sufficient for bankruptcy judges ever to
issue final judgments on non-core matters"); Ralph Brubaker, The Constitutionality of
Litigant Consent to Non-Article III Bankruptcy Adjudications, 32 BANKR. L. LETTER No.
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demonstrated that its "narrow" opinion67 may not be confined to the
single core proceeding identified in the decision. To the contrary, other
proceedings previously identified as "core" have also come under
attack.68 Most notably, the Ninth Circuit recently concluded in Executive
Benefits Insurance Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham)69 that
bankruptcy judges could not constitutionally issue final determinations in
fraudulent conveyance actions absent consent by the defending party.70
The Bellingham decision reasoned that Stern had clarified the position
taken by the Supreme Court in Northern Pipeline: that only matters of
"public rights" could be decided outside of the judicial branch.71
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,72 a Supreme Court case decided in the
years between Northern Pipeline and Stern, had already established the
principal that "a bankruptcy trustee's right to recover a fraudulent
conveyance . .. [is] more accurately characterized as a private rather than
a public right . . . ,,7 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that
12, Dec. 2012, at 1, 8 (arguing that the Waldman court may not have fully appreciated
that its ruling calls into question the constitutionality of bankruptcy judges issuing final
rulings on "non-core" proceedings with litigant consent, and that such a conclusion is
both startling and likely inaccurate based on an historical review of Supreme Court
jurisprudence in bankruptcy).
67. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2620 (2011).
68. See, e.g., Kirschner v. Agoglia (In re Refco, Inc.), 476 B.R. 75, 80
(S.D.N.Y. 2012) (concluding that the fraudulent conveyance claim could not be a "public
rights" claim under the logic of Granfinanciera and Stern and that accordingly the
bankruptcy court could not issue a final determination over the claim); Heller Ehrman
LLP v. Arnold & Porter, LLP (In re Heller Ehrman LLP), 464 B.R. 348, 354 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (finding that the bankruptcy court lacks constitutional authority to enter final
judgment on claims for recovery of alleged fraudulent transfers); In re Fairfield Sentry,
Ltd., 458 B.R. 665, 687-89 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that bankruptcy court could not
adjudicate common law contract claim); Paloian v. Am. Express Co. (In re Canopy Fin.,
Inc.), 464 B.R. 770, 773 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that the bankruptcy court lacks
constitutional authority to enter final judgment on claims for recovery of alleged
fraudulent transfers); Ivey v. Vester (In re Whitley), No. 10-10426-WLS, Adv. No.
11-2056, 2012 WL 1268220, at *2 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Apr. 13, 2012) (finding that
entering a final judgment on claims for recovery of fraudulent transfers is beyond the
scope of the bankruptcy court's constitutional authority); see also Tabor v. Kelly (In re
Davis), No. 05-15794-GWE, Adv. No. 07-05181-L, 2011 WL 5429095 at *14-15
(Bankr. W.D. Tenn. Oct. 5, 2011) (finding that the bankruptcy court could not issue a
final judgment in a preferential transfer claim to recover against a creditor who had not
filed a proof of claim because the matter was a private right); Meoli v. Huntington Nat '
Bank (In re Teleservices Grp.), 456 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011) (noting in
dicta that "Stern and Granfinanciera now seem to hold that only an Article III court
would be capable of entering the money judgment needed to recover [a] preference").
69. 702 F.3d at 553.
70. Id. at 565.
71. ld. at 562.
72. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
73. Id. at 55.
1368 WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
fraudulent conveyance claims cannot be finally adjudicated by
bankruptcy judges, despite earlier Circuit precedent to the contrary:
"Following Stern, we can no longer resist Granfinanciera's logic. 7 4
Interestingly, Granfinanciera was not a case about the bankruptcy
court's constitutional authority to issue final determinations, but rather
about whether jury trials were required in bankruptcy proceedings by
virtue of the Seventh Amendment.75 In Granfinanciera, the trustee had
sought to recover the conveyance of $1.7 million transferred by the
debtor's predecessor to the defendants, who had not filed a claim against
the estate and were not technically creditors of the estate.76 The
defendants subsequently demanded a jury trial on the issue of the alleged
fraudulent conveyance, a demand the bankruptcy judge denied, instead
hearing the merits and issuing a final determination from the bench.77 On
appeal, the Supreme Court concluded that it was error to deny the
defendants a jury trial based on historical analysis of the nature of
74. In re Bellingham, 702 F.3d at 562 (overturning Duck v. Munn (In re
Mankin), 823 F.2d 1296, 1309-10 (9th Cir. 1987) (ruling that bankruptcy judges could
constitutionally issue final determinations in fraudulent conveyance actions despite the
ruling in Northern Pipeline because such proceedings were sufficiently federal to
constitute public rights)). Although many courts have followed similar logic in
determining that fraudulent conveyances cannot be constitutionally included in the
category of core proceedings, others have found that bankruptcy courts may continue to
issue final rulings in such cases. See Onkyo Eur. Elecs. GMBH i. Global Technovations,
Inc. (In re Global Technovations Inc.), 694 F.3d 705, 722 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
the bankruptcy court could issue final judgment in a fraudulent transfer claim because the
creditor had filed a claim against the estate); Gugino v. Canyon Cnty. (In re Bujak), No.
10-03569-JDP, Adv. No. 1l-6038-JDP, 2011 WL 5326038, at *4-5 (Bankr. D. Idaho,
Nov. 3, 2011) (stating "[w]hile it may be interesting to ponder whether, some day, the
Supreme Court could, perhaps, determine that bankruptcy courts may not constitutionally
enter final judgments on such claims, the Court did not do so in Stern" and holding that
the "Trustee's fraudulent conveyance claims against the [creditor] are not based on state
law, but instead, stem solely from the bankruptcy case and arise exclusively under the
Bankruptcy Code"); In re Safety Harbor Resort & Spa, 456 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 2011) ("Nothing in Stern limits a bankruptcy court's jurisdiction over other 'core'
proceedings. Nor does the Stern Court's reliance on its earlier decision in Granfinanciera
somehow impose some new limitations on this Court's jurisdiction that has not existed
since that case was decided over twenty years ago.").
75. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 36.
76. Id. Commentators have been quick in their attempts to limit the likely
ramifications of the Ninth Circuit's conclusion, pointing not only to the possibility of
consent as a mollifying factor, but also limiting the import of Granfinanciera's
conclusion to cases in which the creditor had not filed a proof of claim with the estate.
See, e.g., Burns v. Dennis (In re Se. Materials), 467 B.R. 337, 363 (Bankr. M.D.N.C.
2012) (applying the two-pronged test of Stern and concluding that bankruptcy courts
could not issue final orders in fraudulent conveyance actions, which do not stem from
bankruptcy, "at least where the defendant has not filed a proof of claim"); see also
discussion infra Part IlI.D.2(b).
77. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 37.
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fraudulent conveyance claims. 78 The Court noted that defendants were
entitled by the Seventh Amendment to a jury trial in suits "at law," and
although lower courts had concluded that a fraudulent conveyance action
in bankruptcy was historically a suit at equity, "[t]he nature of the relief
respondent seeks strongly supports our preliminary finding that the right
he invokes should be denominated legal rather than equitable. 79 In
limiting its ruling to the issue of whether or not the claimants were
entitled to a jury trial, the Court skirted the jurisdictional issues that
would later arise in Stern and Bellingham-namely, whether the
bankruptcy judge could constitutionally oversee such a trial. Although
the Court in Granfinanciera did not directly address the issue, its holding
regarding the private nature of fraudulent conveyance actions paved the
way for the Ninth Circuit's ruling in Bellingham.
Assuming that the Ninth Circuit's decision is preserved on appeal,8°
there is reason to expect that whatever solution is reached for Stern's
restrictions on final decision making in counterclaims by the estate
against a creditor will also need to be applied to cases involving
fraudulent conveyances, whether the solution is as mild as establishing
procedures for creditor consent or as radical as withdrawing the reference
in all such proceedings. Going one step further, many believe that the
authority of bankruptcy judges to issue final rulings in preference
proceedings must also be suspect by virtue of the similarities between
preference and fraudulent conveyance proceedings, both in form and in
81historical treatment. In particular, Ralph Brubaker has argued that Stern
signifies the constitutionalization of the summary/plenary distinction
established prior to the enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, making
any authorization of non-Article III judges to enter final orders and
judgments in what would have been plenary proceedings constitutionally
78. Id. at 49.
79. Id. at 46-47.
80. A petition for certiorari was filed on April 3, 2013 and granted on June 24,
2013. Exec. Benefits Ins. Agency v. Arkison (In re Bellingham Ins. Agency, Inc.), 702
F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 2880 (U.S. Apr. 3, 2013) (No.
12-1200).
81. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 49-50 (drawing on the precedent of
Schoenthal v. Irving Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932), a preference case, to establish the
"legal" nature of fraudulent conveyance actions); Meoli v. Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re
Teleservices Grp.), 469 B.R. 713, 757 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (noting the similarities
between preferences and fraudulent conveyances and concluding that these similarities
justify similar treatment); Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 172-73
(arguing that the Court's decision in Stern reflects the intention to constitutionalize the
summary/plenary distinction established by the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, rendering




suspect.82 In so concluding, Brubaker largely glosses over discussion of
the public rights doctrine as a basis for making constitutional
determinations, suggesting that it "likely will not stand.
' 83
As explained in greater detail below, there are good reasons to
disagree with Brubaker's conclusion. The public rights doctrine, while
not well understood and without clear definition in the case law, has
nevertheless proved its staying power across the years, appearing time
and time again in discussion connected with bankruptcy jurisdiction. It
has been the explicit rationale for the Court in striking down the
bankruptcy court's final jurisdiction on at least two, and arguably three,
occasions.84 It has also appeared broadly in cases regarding the
appropriate scope of administrative law and the boundaries of the
administrative state.85 Based on this history, it may be wishful thinking to
declare that the public rights doctrine's time has passed.86 Instead, legal
scholars will likely grapple with the public rights doctrine and its
boundaries for years to come.
II. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS DOCTRINE AND CONCERNS REGARDING
ENCROACHMENT ON ARTICLE III AUTHORITY
A. The Origin and Early Development of the Public Rights Doctrine-
Murray's Lessee, Ex parte Randolph, and Crowell v. Benson
It is generally accepted among scholars that the first manifestation
of the public rights doctrine, and perhaps the first recognition that the
exercise of executive or legislative authority might interfere with the
judicial branch's constitutional authority, arose in the case commonly
82. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 122; see also Brubaker,
Bleak House, supra note 63, at 1-2 ("Stern v. Marshall ... virtually confirms[ ] the
long-smoldering suspicion that subsections 157(b)(2)(F) and (H) of the Judicial Code-
granting non-Article III bankruptcy judges core jurisdiction to enter final orders and
judgments in proceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences and fraudulent
conveyances-are likewise unconstitutional.").
83. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 172.
84. The Court's ruling in Granfinanciera was technically regarding the
availability of jury trials in fraudulent conveyance actions under the Seventh
Amendment, not about the bankruptcy court's authority to enter final judgment.
However, as explained supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text, the logic of
Granfinanciera has been expanded to questions regarding the bankruptcy judge's ability
to enter final judgments. It remains to be seen whether the Court will uphold this
application.
85. See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
853-54 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 585 (1985).
86. Some have argued that the public rights doctrine is inescapably flawed and
should be abandoned. See, e.g., Redish, supra note 11, at 212-14. While such arguments
warrant additional commentary, they are outside the scope of this paper.
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referred to as Murray's Lessee.87 The case stemmed primarily from the
actions of Samuel Swartwout, a collector of customs for the port of New
York who, over the course of eight years, systematically embezzled
$1,374,119.65 from the federal government, an astronomical sum in
those days.88 When his theft was discovered, he evaded punishment by
sailing off to England, leaving the shortfall and a limited amount of
assets, including a piece of real property in New Jersey.
89
One of Swartwout's creditors, James B. Murray, levied against the
New Jersey property.90 However, the U.S. Treasury, Swartwout's prior
employer, contemporaneously issued a "distress warrant" pursuant to
congressional statute, directing the sale of Swartwout's property and the
application of proceeds to the embezzling debt.91 The distress warrant
was executed and the sale conducted, with Hoboken Land &
Improvement Company as the highest bidder, before Murray could move
to enforce his levy. 92 Murray was, naturally, slowed in the race to
execute by the requirements of the judicial collection process. 93 Judicial
sale of the property proceeded despite the prior execution of the distress
warrant.94 At the judicial sale, Murray successfully bid on the property,
and then leased it to John Den.95 With two outstanding claims to the
same property raised by two different private parties by virtue of two
separate sales, Murray brought an action to quiet title,9 6 arguing that the
sale pursuant to the distress warrant was an unconstitutional exercise of
Article III judicial power by non-judicial actors.97
In upholding the congressional action, Justice Benjamin Curtis
rejected the argument that the actions taken constituted an exercise of
87. See, e.g., Alec P. Ostrow, Constitutionality of Core Jurisdiction, 68 Am.
BANKR. L.J. 91, 95 n.33 (1994); Robert G. Skelton & Donald F. Harris, Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction and Jury Trials: The Constitutional Nightmare Continues, 8 BANKR. DEV. J.
469, 477 (1991); Gordon G. Young, Public Rights and the Federal Judicial Power: From
Murray's Lessee through Crowell to Schor, 35 BUFF. L. REv. 765, 789-95 (1987).
88. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. (In re Murray's Lessee), 59
U.S. 272, 274-75 (1855). Multiplication based on the percentage increase in the
Consumer Price Index from 1850 to 2012 suggests that the relative value today would be
over $41 million. See Seven Ways to Compute the Relative Value of a U.S. Dollar
Amount - 1774 to Present, MEASURINGWORTH, http://www.measuringworth.com/m/
calculators/uscompare/ (last visited Nov. 14, 2013).
89. Young, supra note 87, at 791; see also Douglas G. Baird, Blue Collar
Constitutional Law, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 3, 6 (2012).
90. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 274; Baird, supra note 89, at 6-7.
91. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 274-75; Baird, supra note 89, at 7.
92. Baird, supra note 89, at 7.
93. Id.
94. Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 274; Baird, supra note 89, at 7.
95. Baird, supra note 89, at 7.
96. Then termed an act of ejectment. See Murray's Lessee, 59 U.S. at 274.
97. Id at 275.
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Article III judicial power.98 Although "the auditing of the accounts of a
receiver of public moneys may be, in an enlarged sense, a judicial act," 99
he argued,
[T]here are matters, involving public rights, which may be
presented in such form that the judicial power is capable of
acting on them, and which are susceptible of judicial
determination, but which congress may or may not bring within
the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as it may
deem proper. 00
In other words, although the United States could have brought its action
against Swartwout in a judicial proceeding before an Article III judge, it
was not required to do so because of the nature of the proceedings-they
concerned "public rights."
The Supreme Court had previously recognized a potential
constitutional conflict in the area of distress warrants. In Ex parte
Randolph, °1 Chief Justice John Marshall had acknowledged that, if the
government's actions "be the exercise of any part of the judicial power of
the United States, . . . [it] is plainly a violation of the first section of the
third article of the constitution."'102 Murray's Lessee's ruling expanded
the government's authority to act in a judicial manner, at least in the
vaguely defined category of "public rights" cases. This holding was not
significantly questioned for several decades, perhaps, as at least one
scholar has argued, because the danger of executive authority potentially
impinging on the judicial branch was "simply not a matter of significant
concern."' 10 3 Instead, observers were more troubled by the possibility that
federal courts could be drawn into administrative proceedings.,
0 4
This mentality arguably explains the result in Crowell v. Benson,10 5
a case that solidified the dicta in Murray's Lessee regarding public rights
with its own dicta, which restricted any Article III limitations on
administrative courts to situations of "private rights.' 10 6 Having
98. Id. at 280-81.
99. Id. at 280.
100. Id. at 284.
101. 20 F. Cas. 242 (C.C.D. Va. 1833).
102. Id. at 254.
103. Merrill, supra note 3, at 980.
104. Id. at 944.
105. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
106. Id. at 50. The court stated:
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for
the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province, and the
support of their authorized action, does not require the conclusion that there
1372
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concluded that an administrative ruling by the Federal Employees'
Compensation Commission, a federal agency, was inappropriate,' °7 the
Court nonetheless observed that Congress was fully authorized to
establish legislative courts to handle cases "which arise between the
government and persons subject to its authority in connection with the
performance of the constitutional functions of the executive or legislative
departments."' 0 8 Although it neglected to provide a more precise
definition of such cases, the Court did provide a list of "[f]amiliar
illustrations of administrative agencies" established for determining
matters of "public rights," including "interstate and foreign commerce,
taxation, immigration, the public lands, public health, the facilities of the
post office, pensions, and payments to veterans."' 0 9
B. The Public Rights Doctrine in Bankruptcy Cases-Northern Pipeline
and Granfinanciera
After several decades of relative obscurity,"0 discussion of public
rights resurfaced dramatically in the monumental case of Northern
is no limitation of their use, and that the Congress could completely oust the
courts of all determinations of fact by vesting the authority to make them
with finality in its own instrumentalities or in the Executive Department. That
would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the Federal Constitution
Id. at 56-57.
107. Id. at 42, 62. The Court based its ruling on the distinction between so-called
"constitutional facts" and "jurisdictional facts." As explained by a reputable academic of
that time period:
The "jurisdictional fact" doctrine is that where a statute purports to
confer on an administrative agency a power to make decisions, but is
construed as conferring that power only over, or with reference to, certain
kinds of objects, situations or acts, then the fact-question of whether or not in
any given case of such a decision the object, situation or act was, in fact, of
the kind specified in the statute goes to the jurisdiction of the administrative
agency to make the decision at all.
John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review ofAdministrative Determinations of
Questions of "Constitutional Fact", 80 U. PA. L. REv. 1055, 1059 (1932). The doctrinal
basis for this ruling has since disappeared from Supreme Court jurisprudence. See Young,
supra note 87, at 778.
108. Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50.
109. Id. at 50-51.
110. Five years prior to Northern Pipeline, the public rights doctrine was
addressed by the Supreme Court in the case Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and
Health Review Comm 'n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977). In Atlas Roofing, the Supreme Court
upheld the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) insofar as it permitted the
administrative agency to obtain abatement orders and impose civil penalties on
employers without a jury trial. Id. at 446, 461. Several years before that, in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962), the Supreme Court had briefly examined the public rights
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Pipeline v. Marathon."' There, the Court rejected the appellants'
argument that the bankruptcy law should be upheld by virtue of the
public rights doctrine, noting that the public rights doctrine is limited to
matters arising "'between the Government and persons subject to its
authority ... ,,,112 and in the case at hand, the issue was one of "'the
liability of one individual to another... [,],,,l13 a matter "'inherently ...
judicial"' in nature. 14 The Court did not explicate the distinction
between public and private rights, but recognized the doctrine as sound,
if inapplicable to the challenged proceeding.
The Court made reference to the public rights doctrine again in
Granfinanciera, discussed briefly above.'1 5 Drawing on its earlier
language in Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Commission,]'6 the Court again recognized that an exception to the
Seventh Amendment could exist in the administration of public rights by
using the same standard applied in the context of an Article III challenge
to legislative courts." 17 The Court summarized the doctrine as follows:
Congress may devise novel causes of action involving public
rights free from the strictures of the Seventh Amendment if it
assigns their adjudication to tribunals without statutory
authority to employ juries as factfinders. But it lacks the power
to strip parties contesting matters of private right of their
constitutional right to a trial by jury.118
In Granfinanciera, the Court ruled that Congress had attempted to
strip the right to a jury trial from defendants in a fraudulent conveyance
exception in the context of evaluating whether judges sitting on the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were, as Congress claimed they were, Article
III judges. Id. at 531-32. Because the Court concluded that both judges were in fact
appointed pursuant to Article II, the public rights doctrine proved irrelevant to the
outcome. See id. at 584. The Court did make a point of saying that matters of public
rights, although they may be determined by a non-Article III "legislative court," are still
appropriate for determination by an Article Ill "constitutional court." Id. at 550-51.
There appear to be no other major cases on this issue between Crowell and Northern
Pipeline.
111. 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
112. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 50).
113. Id. at 69-70 (quoting Crowell, 285 U.S. at 5 1).
114. Id. at 68 (quoting Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 458 (1929)). See
also Baird, supra note 89, at 6 (noting that "resolving a contest between two creditors" is
"the ordinary business of courts, and it is exactly what the Framers had in mind when
thinking about the judicial power").
115. See supra notes 72-79 and accompanying text.
116. 430 U.S. 442 (1977); see supra note 110.
117. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 53 (1989).
118. Id. at 51-52.
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action, when that action was the sole basis for the defendants'
involvement in the case: the creditors had not filed a proof of claim and
were not officially creditors of the estate.1 9 "Although the issue admits
of some debate," the Court concluded, the action was better characterized
as one of private rights, not public rights.1
20
C. The Lasting Influence of the Public Rights Doctrine-Thomas, Schor,
and Stern
The years between Northern Pipeline and Granfinanciera saw
additional cases referencing the public rights doctrine outside of the
bankruptcy context, dealing instead with agency adjudication. These
cases sought to clarify the extent to which the public rights doctrine
permitted adjudication by non-Article III courts, but often did so in a
way that appeared to contradict the protective position demonstrated in
Northern Pipeline. Outside the context of bankruptcy, Supreme Court
jurisprudence trended towards expanding the authority of non-Article III
courts, permitting a larger category of cases to be heard and determined
outside of Article III.
Scarcely three years after Northern Pipeline was decided, Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agriculture Products Co.121 presented the Supreme Court
with another occasion to consider an Article III challenge, this time to
the binding arbitration provision of the 1978 amendments to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 122 The Act
provided that manufacturers submit research data regarding their
product's health, safety, and environmental effects to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) as a precondition for registration of a pesticide
and permitted manufacturers to reference prior submissions as a method
of streamlining the process and to avoid duplication of effort.2 3
However, disputes arose when those manufacturers who had submitted
research data demanded compensation from later manufacturers for their
"follow-on" use. 124 The Act had originally provided that the parties
would negotiate the amount of compensation, or, if negotiations failed,
the EPA, subject to judicial review, would determine compensation. 25
However, the EPA soon became bogged down with compensation
determinations, so Congress amended the statute to provide for a system
119. Id. at50.
120. Id. at 55.
121. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
122. ld. at571.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 571-73.
125. Id. at 572.
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of binding arbitration to resolve compensation disputes among
registrants.
126
The plaintiffs in Thomas brought suit to challenge the Act on the
basis that the binding arbitration provision violated Article III of the
Constitution by allocating the function of judicial officers to
arbitrators.12 7 They cited the Court's decision in Northern Pipeline as
support.12 8 The Court's opinion upholding the arbitration provisions
appeared to take a step back from Northern Pipeline, noting that in that
case "[a] divided Court was unable to agree on the precise scope and
nature of Article III's limitations.0 2 9 The Court then limited the holding
of Northern Pipeline as establishing "only that Congress may not vest in
a non-Article III court the power to adjudicate, render final judgment,
and issue binding orders in a traditional contract action arising under
state law, without consent of the litigants, and subject only to ordinary
appellate review., 130 This holding did not apply to the proceedings at
issue in Thomas, the Court explained, because the rights to compensation
under FIFRA did not depend on or replace a right to compensation for
use of data under state law."'
The Court also disavowed the concept of a bright-line test created
by the public rights doctrine, noting that an indiscriminate reliance on
characterization of a right as either private, and therefore requiring
Article III adjudication, or public, and therefore needing no Article III
involvement, "did not command a majority of the Court in Northern
Pipeline."'32 Accordingly, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' interpretation
of Northern Pipeline and Crowell as "establishing that the right to an
Article III forum is absolute unless the Federal Government is a party of
record."'3 Instead, the Court explained:
[T]he public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic
understanding that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial
method of resolving matters that "could be conclusively
determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches," the
danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced. 134
126. Id. at 573.
127. Id. at 576.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 584.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 585-86.
133. Id. at 586.
134. Id. at 589 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 68 (1982)).
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In this case, the Court observed, the right to compensation created by
FIFRA, although between two individual litigants, bore many of the
characteristics of a public right; most notably, it was part of a public
program, and it served a public purpose. 135 The Court then held "that
Congress, acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its
constitutional powers under Article I, may create a seemingly 'private'
right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be
a matter appropriate for agency resolution."'
' 36
The Court in Thomas thus expanded the public rights doctrine to
include seemingly "private" rights, while simultaneously undermining
the strength of the public/private rights test in favor of a more flexible
approach. The Court went even further the next year, in Commodity
Futures Trading Commission v. Schor,137 which dealt with yet another
Article III challenge to a legislative court, based on the previous decision
in Northern Pipeline. The dispute in Schor arose when a client sued his
commodity futures broker on the grounds that the broker had violated
portions of the Commodity Exchange Act, resulting in trading losses and
expenses that had completely depleted the client's account, leaving a
negative balance.138 Pursuant to applicable regulation, the client invoked
the jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC)
to address his claims, but only after the broker filed an action in Federal
District Court to recover the negative balance. 39 The client twice moved,
both times unsuccessfully, to dismiss the broker's suit in district court;
eventually the broker voluntarily dismissed the action and brought a
counterclaim before the CFTC instead. 140 Only after the CFTC had ruled
in favor of the broker did the client object to the CFTC's statutory
authority to adjudicate the broker's counterclaim.' 4'
On the surface, the dispute in Schor appeared very similar to that in
Northern Pipeline, in that both involved a state law counterclaim raised
before a non-Article III tribunal. However, the Court's analysis and
holding in Schor sharply departed from those given in Northern Pipeline.
In departing from the strong protective approach used in Northern
Pipeline, the Court picked up where it had left off in Thomas, applying a
flexible standard that evaluated the purposes underlying the requirements
135. Id.
136. Id. at 593-94.
137. 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
138. Id. at 837.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 838.
141. Id. In bringing the action challenging the CFTC's ruling for lack of
statutory authority, when he himself had insisted on that forum, the client likely came
across as disingenuous to the Court.
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of Article III, and rejected the bright-line test. 142 The Court observed that
Article III was intended to protect the role of the independent judiciary
for the sake of individual litigants, and to preserve the constitutional
system of checks and balances.1 43 Having concluded that the client
waived his right to an independent judiciary when he filed his claim
before the CFTC, 44 the Court moved on to analyze the separation of
powers issue. It first reaffirmed its reluctance to take a bright-line stance
in ruling on issues involving "the adjudication of Article III business in a
non-Article III tribunal," adopting instead a multi-factored approach
which analyzed "the extent to which the 'essential attributes of judicial
power' are reserved to Article III courts, . . . the origins and importance
of the right to be adjudicated, and the concerns that drove Congress to
depart from the requirements of Article III.', 145 The Court then
distinguished Schor from Northern Pipeline on the basis that the agency
model invoked by the CFTC had been earlier approved in Crowell, and
was far more specialized, with closer review by the district court, than
the bankruptcy court model at issue in Northern Pipeline.146 As for the
discussion of the public rights doctrine, the Court in Schor acknowledged
the public/private right dichotomy, but asserted again that the
identification of rights as public or private "does not end our inquiry
.... ,,147 Instead, the identification of rights as private simply warrants a
more searching examination of congressional action.
48
The rulings in Thomas and Schor led some to surmise that Northern
Pipeline was no longer good law. 149 These commentators further
predicted that, although Northern Pipeline had not been explicitly
overruled by Thomas and Schor, the bright-line holding of Northern
Pipeline would probably impose few, if any, limitations on Congress's
ability to determine the form and forum of adjudication in the federal
142. Id. at 847-48.
143. Id. at 850.
144. Id. at 849.
145. Id. at 851.
146. Id. at 852-53.
147. Id. at 853.
148. Id. at 854.
149. See George D. Brown, Article III as a Fundamental Value-The Demise of
Northern Pipeline and Its Implications for Congressional Power, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 75
(1988) ("The fact that [Justice Brennan] dissented and the content of his opinion raise the
question of whether Northern Pipeline is still good law, let alone the foundation of a
major new doctrine."); Carl N. Pickerill, Specialized Adjudication in an Administrative
Forum: Bridging the Gap between Public and Private Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
1605, 1642 (2007) ("While Schor did not overrule Northern Pipeline explicitly, one must
wonder whether Northern Pipeline still has staying power."); Richard B. Saphire &
Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post
CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REv. 85, 107 (1988).
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system.15° This view was not universally shared, however, particularly
following the Supreme Court's ruling in Granfinanciera, which again
referenced the public rights doctrine. For example, in recent years Caleb
Nelson has argued forcefully in support of the public rights doctrine,
suggesting that the efforts of modem commentators to move beyond the
traditional framework in an effort to draw appropriate lines around
judicial power are illusory. 151 Nonetheless, prior to Stern, the trend in
thinking appeared to be that Northern Pipeline was outdated and likely to
be limited to its facts, if not actually overturned.
152
D. What is the Public Rights Doctrine?-A Synopsis of Current Law
The development of case law described above makes a clean
synthesis of the public rights doctrine almost impossible, as the Court has
recognized. 153 There are essentially two competing approaches to
non-Article III courts and their jurisdictional authority, and each has held
sway at different times in the past thirty years. The first approach is most
clearly represented by the decision in Northern Pipeline; it reserves
judicial power-that is, the ability to enter a final determination-to
Article III courts, except in "narrow situations ... in which the grant of
power to the Legislative and Executive Branches" justifies the power to
create legislative courts and does not threaten the separation of
powers.' 54 These narrow situations include the category of "public
rights" cases, 55 which Northern Pipeline defines to include only matters
arising "'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in
150. See Brown, supra note 149, at 75-76; see also Saphire & Solimine, supra
note 149, at 112 (arguing that any reliance on the doctrine of public rights is "misguided"
in light of the Court's "half-hearted application").
151. Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REv.
559, 613 (2007) ("Even while modem commentators purport to get beyond distinctions
of the sort that the traditional framework draws, they have found it impossible to do so.
Their understanding of the relationship between 'political' and 'judicial' power inevitably
reflects the distinction between legal interests that belong to the public and legal interests
that belong instead to individual citizens.").
152. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is Time to Overrule
Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 317 (1991). This mindset helps to explain
why the Court's ruling in Stern was so astonishing to so many. But see Brown, supra note
13, at 181 ("Regardless of one's view of the outcome in [Stern], it was hardly
surprising.").
153. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611 (2011).
154. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50,64(1982).
155. The decision in Northern Pipeline also addresses two other categories of
appropriate congressional use of legislative courts: territorial courts and courts-martial.
See id. at 64-66.
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connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments .. .
The second approach is most clearly represented by the Court's
decision in Schor, decided only four years after Northern Pipeline. In
Schor, the Court loosened the constraints on legislative courts by
adopting a multi-part balancing test over Northern Pipeline's
rule-with-exceptions approach. 157 Rather than adopting the assumption
that the exercise of judicial power was in conflict with Article III, the
Schor decision appeared to authorize legislative adjudication so long as
the "essential attributes" of judicial power remained in Article III courts,
important "core" rights continued to be adjudicated by Article III courts,
and Congress offered a valid justification for using the legislative
courts.' 58 Due to this more relaxed standard, the need for a case to fall
within the public rights exception became less important;159 even a
matter of private rights could be brought before a legislative court so
long as the factors identified by the Court were satisfied.
60
The differences between these two approaches have raised serious
questions about the importance of the public rights doctrine in answering
questions raised by legislative courts and Article III. In addition, the
Court has refrained, for the most part, from making definitive statements
about the boundaries of the public rights doctrine,' 6 ' although some
principles may be consistently observed. It seems to be generally agreed
that causes of action created exclusively by the Legislative or Executive
branches, acting within their constitutional authority, are appropriately
categorized as public rights. 162 This is particularly true where the
156. Id. at 67-68 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50 (1932)),
157. See generally Commodity Futures Trading Comm 'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833
(1989).
158. Id. at 851-53.
159. See id. at 853.
160. Id. at 854.
161. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011) (declining to
confirm or deny the prior suggestion that "the restructuring of debtor-creditor relations is
in fact a public right"); N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 71 (noting that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations "may well be a 'public right,"' but declining to say so
definitively). This propensity of the Court to demure on the issue of what is a public right
is a point of particular consternation in the bankruptcy community. See Brown, supra
note 13, at 213 ("This ambiguity concerning a critical feature of the modem bankruptcy
structure invites further strategic, piecemeal litigation and ensures that a cloud of
uncertainty will hang over bankruptcy practice until it is finally resolved."); Mark S.
Scarberry, The Supreme Court's Decision in Stem v. Marshall. Analysis & Implications
(Pepperdine Univ. Sch. Law, Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Paper No. 14, 2011),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmnabstract-id=1888685.
162. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2598 ("The Court has continued ... to limit the
[public rights] exception to cases in which the claim at issue derives from a federal
regulatory scheme, or in which resolution of the claim by an expert Government agency
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government itself is a party, although it may also include situations
where two private parties operate under a federal regulatory scheme.
1 63
However, the right created must be sufficiently distinct from a state
common law action so as not to be duplicative; causes of action that are
more than "closely analogous" may be "more accurately characterized as
a private rather than a public right."'164
Recognizing the historical uncertainty regarding the importance of
the public rights doctrine, the Supreme Court decision in Stern has
definitively adopted the Northern Pipeline approach, suggesting that, at
least in the bankruptcy context, the current Court views the public rights
doctrine as a determinative principle.1 65 The Court reaffirmed the
relevance of the public rights doctrine in the context of bankruptcy
courts, even while acknowledging that its relevance may have waned in
the area of administrative law.166 The Court's decision in Stern hearkens
more closely to a bright-line distinction than a weighing of factors, and
maintains, despite recognizing the logistical consequences, that cases of
is deemed essential to a limited regulatory objective within the agency's authority. In
other words, it is still the case that what makes a right 'public' rather than private is that
the right is integrally related to particular Federal Government action."); see also Schor,
478 U.S. at 851 ("In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to
authorize the adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal
impermissibly threatens the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has
declined to adopt formalistic and unbending rules. Although such rules might lend a
greater degree of coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict
Congress' ability to take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers."
(internal citation omitted)); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568,
593-94 (1985) ("Our holding is limited to the proposition that Congress, acting for a
valid legislative purpose pursuant to its constitutional powers under Article I, may create
a seemingly 'private' right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as
to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by the Article
III judiciary.").
163. See Thomas, 473 U.S. at 589; Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455-56 (1977). But see Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2620
(Scalia, J., concurring); Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 65 (1989) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
164. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 52, 55.
165. See Kuney, supra note 9, at 1-2 ("The Stern v. Marshall decision cuts back
at the seemingly more lenient approach to Congressional incursions into the domain of
Article III found in [Schor], and appears to be a reaction, a slap back, to Congress's
practice of expansively defining the bankruptcy courts' power .... ").
166. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (noting that "there may be instances in which the
distinction between public and private rights-at least as framed by some of our recent
cases-fails to provide concrete guidance" but distinguishing such instances from the
case at hand). In contrast, the dissent argued for a more flexible approach to Article III
constraints, and a return to the thinking behind Crowell v. Benson and presumably
Thomas and Schor, suggesting that "non-Article III adjudication of 'private rights' is not
necessarily unconstitutional," but rather that proceedings involving private rights warrant
a more "searching" constitutional examination. Id. at 2625 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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private rights must not be taken from the Article III judiciary. 67 The
Stern decision also seeks to constrict the scope of public rights, resisting
the expansion suggested by Thomas and Schor.168 Overall, the attitude is
one of an Article III retrenchment, using Northern Pipeline as a guide. 1
69
Further, although Stern has not adopted a precise test, it has
indicated a two-pronged approach that lends itself to an easy application
of the public rights doctrine. Many lower courts have subsequently
adopted this approach.' 70 The first prong of the Stern test is whether "the
action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself," and the second is
whether the action "would necessarily be resolved in the claims
allowance process."'' The satisfaction of either prong would be
sufficient to establish the bankruptcy judge's authority to enter final
judgment; the failure of both confines the bankruptcy judge to do no
more than issue a report and recommendation.
172
Both prongs of the Stern test relate to public rights characteristics.
The first prong, whether the action stems from the bankruptcy itself,
relates to statements by the Court indicating that public rights must be
directly linked to a Congressional "regulatory scheme,"' 73 that "Congress
may devise novel causes of action" and assign their adjudication to
legislative courts, 1 74 and that the Executive and Legislative branches be
permitted sufficient latitude to fulfill their duties. 75 The second prong,
whether the action would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance
167. See id. at 2615.
168. Id. at 2613 ("[I]t is still the case that what makes a right 'public' rather than
private is that the right is integrally related to particular federal government action.").
169. Id. at 2618 (The Court quotes Northern Pipeline's exhortation that "even
with respect to matters that arguably fall within the scope of the 'public rights' doctrine,
the presumption is in favor of Art. III courts." N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 n.23 (1982)).
170. See Crist, supra note 2, at 636-37 (describing the Stern two-prong test for
identifying adjudicatory authority).
171. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618; see also Crist, supra note 2, at 637.
172. See Crist, supra note 2, at 637.
173. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2598; see also Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods.
Co., 473 U.S. 568, 593-94 (1985).
174. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51(1989).
175. Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986)
("In determining the extent to which a given congressional decision to authorize the
adjudication of Article III business in a non-Article III tribunal impermissibly threatens
the institutional integrity of the Judicial Branch, the Court has declined to adopt
formalistic and unbending rules. Although such rules might lend a greater degree of
coherence to this area of the law, they might also unduly constrict Congress' ability to
take needed and innovative action pursuant to its Article I powers." (citation omitted));
see also Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590 ("Given the nature of the right at issue and the concerns
motivating the Legislature, we do not think this system threatens the independent role of
the Judiciary in our constitutional scheme.").
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process, is more complicated. The Court likely drew this prong from
prior precedent, much of it involving preference actions that pre-dated
the revival of the public rights doctrine. 176 In this precedent, the Court
has issued rulings on the basis of whether actions satisfy this prong, but
without explicitly finding that the "claims allowance process" is itself
deemed to be within the public rights doctrine. 77 The Supreme Court's
reticence to confirm this conclusion is disconcerting to some, as it forces
analysts to make assumptions in an area where assumptions have been
frequently undermined. Nevertheless, a straightforward reading of Stern
suggests that bankruptcy proceedings which fulfill either of these
requirements may be properly categorized as public rights, and
accordingly determined by a non-Article III court.
E. The Ongoing Validity of the Public Rights Doctrine
Despite Stern's repeated reference to the public rights exception,
some, most notably Brubaker, have argued nevertheless that the doctrine
is not a reliable prediction for how the Court will rule in future cases.
178
Brubaker has instead suggested that the true underpinnings of the Stern
decision are a return to the historical boundaries of "summary" and
"plenary" jurisdiction; in other words, all proceedings formerly under a
bankruptcy referee's summary jurisdiction are likely to fall under a
bankruptcy judge's authority to enter a final disposition, but former
plenary proceedings will not.179 To Brubaker, the Court's reference to the
176. See, e.g., Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review
Comm'n, 430 U.S. 442, 455 (1977); Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327-28 (1966)
(distinguishing between situations in which preferences may be brought as a summary
proceeding and when they must be brought as a plenary action); Schoenthal v. Irving
Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92, 94-95 (1932); see also discussion infra Part III.D.2. But see
Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 45 (1990) (noting, without reference to the public
rights exception, that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial in a preference action if it does
not submit a claim against the estate).
177. See, e.g., Katchen, 382 U.S. at 330 ("Unavoidably and by the very terms of
the Act, when a bankruptcy trustee presents a § 57g objection to a claim, the claim can
neither be allowed nor disallowed until the preference matter is adjudicated. The
objection under § 57g is, like other objections, part and parcel of the allowance process
and is subject to summary adjudication by a bankruptcy court."); discussion infra Part
llI.D.2(a).
178. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 172; see also Meoli v.
Huntington Nat'l Bank (In re Teleservices Grp., Inc.), 456 B.R. 318, 343 (Bankr. W.D.
Mich. 2011) ("[T]here is no need to get ensnarled in the public rights/private rights
debate to answer whether a particular order issued by the bankruptcy court is final or
not.").
179. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 122-23; see also Kuney,
supra note 9, at 9-10 (arguing that Stern's reasoning seems to apply to all matters that




public rights exception in Stern is nothing but legal hand-waving with no
persuasive power or precedential force. His take on Stern, though not
without its strengths, is ultimately unpersuasive.
Brubaker's preferred interpretation of the Stern logic appears to
stem primarily from Justice Antonin Scalia's views as expressed in his
concurrence 180 As noted above, the majority in Stern did not identify any
bankruptcy proceeding as meeting the standard for a public right, but did
leave open the possibility that the restructuring of debtor-creditor
relations, an overarching theme within bankruptcy law, is itself a public
right. 181 Scalia, on the other hand, writing separately, reaffirmed the
opinion he expressed earlier in Granfinanciera that the restructuring of
debtor-creditor relations was not in itself a public right, because all
public rights must involve the United States as a party.182 Brubaker
suggests that the majority's reluctance to rely on the public rights
doctrine, and Scalia's explicit rejection of the doctrine except in very
narrow circumstances, indicate that a different rationale is at work in
justifying non-Article III bankruptcy adjudications-namely, historical
practice. 183
Brubaker's argument relies too strongly on the lone opinion of
Scalia, particularly since it ignores the stated rationale of the Court. In
other words, it is an unconvincing argument that, despite the fact that the
majority opinion and the dissent' 84 both referenced the public rights
exception, the true direction of the Court is likely to be the historical
precedent that appears to be favored by a single Justice's concurrence. It
is far more likely that the majority and dissenting opinions both reference
the public rights doctrine because the Court still considers it an
appropriate mechanism by which to judge alleged threats to the
separation of powers doctrine, whether it is dispositive, as in Northern
Pipeline, or a factor among many, as in Schor.
The best way to understand the Supreme Court's view of public
rights in the context of bankruptcy is to take the Stern opinion on its face,
as an ongoing struggle to determine the constitutional scope of legislative
courts in light of the Court's historically inconsistent treatment of the
public rights doctrine. There is clearly a lingering debate over the scope
of the public rights doctrine, but this weakness does not undermine its
ultimate relevance, particularly in the bankruptcy context.
180. See generally Brubaker, A "Summary " Theory, supra note 8, at 165-66.
181. Sternv. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2614 n.7 (2011).
182. Id. at 2620 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I would return to the
longstanding principle that the public rights doctrine requires, at a minimum, that the
United States be a party to the adjudication.").
183. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 164-66.
184. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2623 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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III. THE PUBLIC RIGHTS NATURE OF PREFERENCES
This next section applies the public rights doctrine to the typical
preference proceeding, demonstrating that, under a narrow or an
expansive reading of the doctrine, it is appropriate for a non-Article III
judge to issue final determinations in preference actions. The first task in
making this argument is to explain the nature and function of preference
proceedings.
A. The Nature and Function of Preferences
Preference actions under English law, the clear predecessor to
current American law in the area of bankruptcy, were initially justified
using the same grounds as fraudulent conveyance actions, that is, the law
sought to punish debtors who transferred property with the intent of
hindering, delaying, or defrauding their creditors. 185 Many of the
American states adopted similar laws, either by statute or by inherited
common law.186 As bankruptcy laws developed in the United States,
however, Congress altered the nature of preferences, first by replacing a
debtor's culpable intent to grant a preference1 87 with the requirement that
the receiving creditor have reasonable cause to believe the transfer was a
preference, 88 and then eventually removing any intent requirement at
all. 8 9 Preference law today is a matter of strict liability during the
preference period for preferred creditors.' 90
185. See Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 1571, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (Eng.); see also John
C. McCoid, 1I, Bankruptcy, Preferences, and Efficiency: An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA.
L. REV. 249, 250-51 (1981) [hereinafter McCoid, Expression of Doubt].
186. See Vein Countryman, The Concept of a Voidable Preference in
Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REV. 713, 714 (1985) [hereinafter Countryman, Voidable
Preference].
187. See 2 GARRAD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES
700-01 (rev. ed. 1940) (explaining the view that the debtor's motives are of no
importance for the purpose of determining a preference).
188. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, 562 (1898) (amended 1938);
see also Countryman, Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 722-23; McCoid,
Expression of Doubt, supra note 185, at 257; Robert Weisberg, Commercial Morality, the
Merchant Character, and the History of the Voidable Preference, 39 STAN L. REV. 3,
86-87 (1986) (suggesting that the shift reflects a slow shift in law, "from the notion of
the debtor's moral duty to his creditors, to the notion, essentially irrelevant under English
doctrine, of the preferred creditor's moral duty to his fellow creditors" (citation omitted)).
189. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2012); see also Countryman, Voidable Preference,
supra note 186, at 722-23.
190. See McCoid, Expression of Doubt, supra note 185, at 259; see also In re
Hall, 4 AM. B. R. 671, 678 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1900) (critiquing the statutory move away
from the intent requirement); Weisberg, supra note 188, at 89-90 (discussing Referee
William Hotchkiss's critique of the system in In re Hall).
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Determining whether a transfer constitutes a preference today is a
matter of applying five straightforward statutory qualifications.' 9' A
preferential transfer is defined as: (1) a transfer to or for the benefit of a
creditor; (2) on account of an antecedent debt; (3) made while the debtor
was insolvent; (4) during the preference period, generally ninety days
before the bankruptcy filing; (5) with the consequence that the recipient
receives more than he would have' 92 had the transfer not been made and
the estate liquidated pursuant to chapter 7.193
The primary purpose ascribed to preference law is to preserve the
bankruptcy policy of distribution, which could otherwise be frustrated by
pre-bankruptcy transfers. 94 The bankruptcy policy of distribution has
191. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
192. Id. Many courts have interpreted this rule to require only that the trustee
establish that the unsecured, nonpriority creditor would have received less than 100%
payout in chapter 7, rather than requiring the trustee to prove what the general dividend to
unsecured, nonpriority creditors would be. See Savage & Assocs., P.C. v. Mandl (In re
Teligent Inc.), 380 B.R. 324, 339 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008); Countryman, Voidable
Preference, supra note 186, at 736-37.
193. The full text of 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) reads as follows:
(b) Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee
may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property-
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before
such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made-
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the
petition; or
(B) between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition, if such creditor at the time of such transfer was an
insider; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would
receive if-
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent
provided by the provisions of this title.
194. See Countryman, Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 748; Weisberg,
supra note 188, at 3-4. Deterring creditors from rushing to collect from a struggling
debtor, thereby increasing the likelihood of a bankruptcy filing, has also been cited as a
justification for preference law. However, there are good reasons to discount the deterring
effect of preferences. First, there is a chance that a preferential transfer will not be
avoided, either because the transfer will fall outside the ninety day mark, or some defense
will apply. Second, even if the creditor is "caught" by preference law, the consequence is
simply a surrender of the prize. Thus the creditor has little to lose and everything to gain
by attempting to collect from the debtor on the eve of bankruptcy. See Countryman,
Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 748; McCoid, Expression of Doubt, supra note
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generally been identified as "equal treatment of creditors,"1 95 although it
is probably more accurate to characterize the policy as "equal treatment
among similarly situated creditors"; the presence or absence of security
can alter creditors' treatment, as can their status as priority or
non-priority creditors. 196 This purpose helps to explain the strict nature of
preference liability; it makes no difference to the goal of equal treatment
if the debtor or the creditor intended the transfer to be preferential; the
relevant inquiry is simply whether the transfer is, in fact, preferential.
A creditor who receives a voidable preference has some defenses to
surrendering the preference, outlined in Subsection (c) of Section 547. 197
For example, transfers that were intended to be and were in actuality
substantially contemporaneous cannot be avoided, 198 nor can transfers
made in the ordinary course of business, 199 transfers made in exchange
for new value,2 °° or transfers below a certain amount.20 1 But outside these
exceptions, the strict nature of preference law can have surprising and
unfortunate consequences for creditors.20 2
If a creditor has received a preferential transfer, the trustee of the
bankruptcy estate is given the authority to avoid the transfer.203 The
decision to pursue the transfer is left to the trustee's discretion, although
he or she may be responsible to other creditors, who may object to the
trustee's decision not to pursue a preference that could, if recovered,
enrich the estate to the benefit of all other creditors.20 4 In addition, a
185, at 263-64 ("If a creditor may be able to keep the payment and at worst only has to
return it, he has every incentive to accept it."). But see ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY
LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 487 (6th ed. 2009)
(suggesting that the greatest importance of the preference provision may be its effect on
pre-bankruptcy behavior, "because some debtors may be better able to resist demands
from their creditors by pointing out that the transactions could be avoided by a
subsequent bankruptcy filing").
195. See McCoid, Expression of Doubt, supra note 185, at 260 ("Equal treatment
of creditors is the oldest and most frequently advanced goal of preference law.").
196. See Countryman, Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 748.
197. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c).
198. Id. § 547(c)(1).
199. Id. § 547(c)(2).
200. Id. § 547(c)(3)-(4).
201. Id. § 547(c)(8)-(9).
202. See, e.g., Comm. Creditors Holding Unsecured Claims v. Koch Oil Co. (In
re Powerine Oil Co.), 59 F.3d 969, 971 (9th Cir. 1995) ("Can an unsecured creditor be
better off when the debtor defaults rather than paying off the debt? Yes: Law can be
stranger than fiction in the Preference Zone.").
203. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).
204. Such limitations include the ability of creditors to withhold a favorable vote
for plans that do not avoid preferential transfers, thereby preventing confirmation. See
generally Chad P. Pugatch et al., The Lost Art of Chapter 11 Reorganization, 19 U. FLA.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 39, 52 (2008). And the requirement that a confirmable plan must be
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preferred creditor's claims will not be allowed unless and until the
creditor surrenders the preferential transfer.20 5
B. The Case for Similar Treatment of Preferences and Fraudulent
Conveyances
Perhaps because both preferences and fraudulent conveyances fall
under a trustee's avoidance powers, and, because they may cover the
same or very similar transactions, it is tempting to assume that they
should be treated similarly in terms of constitutional analysis. If Article
III of the Constitution prohibits a non-Article III judge from issuing a
final determination on whether a trustee may avoid a transfer made with
the intent to hinder, delay and defraud, as in a fraudulent conveyance,
then, many argue, the Constitution must also prohibit the same judge
from issuing a final determination on an action by the trustee to avoid a
similar transfer made without such intent.20 6 Even more broadly, in both
types of action "the trustee simply is seeking to augment the estate for
the benefit of creditors, 20' 7  a characterization that rings true for
counterclaims against the estate, of the type considered by Stern, as well.
Some have argued that this is, after all, the lesson of Stern; any attempt
by the trustee to augment the estate cannot constitutionally be a "core
proceeding.
20 8
In making his argument that preference actions, like fraudulent
conveyance actions, are likely to be found unconstitutional if treated as
"fair and equitable" and cannot "discriminate unfairly." 1 1 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012). In
addition, it may be possible for creditors to obtain derivative standing to assert such
claims, if they can establish a colorable cause of action and show that the estate trustee
unjustifiably failed to bring suit on behalf of the estate. See Fogel v. Zell, 221 F.3d 955,
965-66 (7th Cir. 2000).
205. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (2012).
206. See, e.g., Brubaker, Bleak House, supra note 63, at 16-17; S. Elizabeth
Gibson, Jury Trials and Core Proceedings: The Bankruptcy Judge's Uncertain Authority,
65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 143, 169 (1991) ("Throughout its opinion the [Granfinanciera] Court
equated fraudulent conveyance and preference actions, and thus seemingly indicated that
the article Ii, as well as the seventh amendment, analysis would be the same for these
types of proceedings.").
207. McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 40.
208. See Crist, supra note 2, at 627. A further argument that preferences should
be considered outside the scope of constitutional "core proceedings" after Stern might be
a return to Northern Pipeline's assertion that public rights proceedings are only those in
which the government is involved as a party. See N. Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69 (1982). This position appears to have been largely abandoned by the
Court. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2613 (2011). But it has been repeatedly
reaffirmed by Justice Scalia. See id. at 2620 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Granfinanciera S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 70 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("I
would return to the longstanding principle that the public rights doctrine requires, at a
minimum, that the United States be a party to the adjudication.").
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core proceedings,2 0 9 Brubaker points to the fact that the Supreme Court,
in Granfinanciera, referred to the preference proceeding in Schoenthal v.
Irving Trust Companyf as "indistinguishable" from the fraudulent
conveyance suit at issue "in all relevant respects. 2 11 In light of their
similarities, the Court felt itself free to lean on Schoenthal as precedent
for its conclusion that such suits were and should be brought at law,
preserving the right of trial by jury.212
It is worth noting, however, that a contemporary scholar condemned
the Court for this course of action, arguing that the Court had
misinterpreted history when it conflated preference proceedings, which
were typically heard at law, with fraudulent conveyance actions, which
were more generally decided in a court of equity. 13 Accordingly, the
Court may have been incorrect both in its historical conclusion that the
fraudulent conveyance action at hand would have been heard in a court
of law,214 and in its suggestion that cases dealing with preferences and
fraudulent conveyances could be conflated. Regardless, more recent
Supreme Court precedent has at least implicitly acknowledged the public
rights nature of preferences, suggesting that the Court now views them as
distinct from fraudulent conveyances. 21 5 As demonstrated below, there
are valid reasons for distinguishing between the two in the public rights
context.1 6
Others have argued that preferences must be excluded from core
proceedings because, like actions to recover fraudulent conveyances or
pursue a counterclaim against a creditor, they seek to "augment" the
estate, rather than distribute it.21 7 Courts considering actions under
Stern's two-pronged approach 21 8 have concluded that proceedings
209. Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 183 ("[T]he rationale of
the Granfinanciera decision itself clearly called into doubt the constitutionality of
bankruptcy judges' core jurisdiction over preference and fraudulent conveyance suits.
After Stern v. Marshall, the conclusion seems inescapable that such core jurisdiction to
enter final judgment ... is unconstitutional." (internal citation omitted)); see also Robert
Miller, Fleshing Out the Skeleton: Defining the Prongs of Stem v. Marshall, 11 DEPAUL
Bus. & COM. L.J. 1, 52-53 (2012) (defending the view that Supreme Court jurisprudence
leads to the conclusion that both fraudulent conveyances and preferences are outside a
bankruptcy court's constitutional adjudication).
210. 287 U.S. 92 (1932).
211. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 48; see also In re Teleservices Grp., Inc., 469
B.R. 713, 757 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2012) (noting the similarities between preferences and
constructive fraudulent transfers).
212. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 48-49.
213. McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 23-25.
214. See id. at 28.
215. See discussion infra Part 1I1D.
216. See infra Part III.C.
217. See, e.g., Crist, supra note 2, at 671-72 (citing cases).
218. See supra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
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intended to augment the bankruptcy estate do not stem from the
bankruptcy itself, under the logic that bankruptcy is concerned only with
"a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res. '2' l9 These courts draw support
from Stern's reaffirmance of "Granfinanciera's distinction between
actions that seek 'to augment the bankruptcy estate' and those that seek
'a pro rata share of the bankruptcy res.' ', 220
Although this standard is attractive for its simplicity-it is fairly
easy to identify actions that seek to augment rather than distribute-it
misrepresents the Court's position. A quick reference to the
Granfinanciera opinion demonstrates that the actual distinction was
between actions that "more nearly resemble state-law contract claims
brought by a bankrupt corporation to augment the bankruptcy estate than
they do creditor's hierarchically ordered claims to a pro rata share of the
bankruptcy res."22' In other words, the relevant inquiry is not whether the
action will augment the bankruptcy estate, but whether it will do so via
claims based on private rights under state law.
These arguments, and others not presented here, seek to apply the
doctrine of Stern and its predecessors, albeit without grappling with the
public rights doctrine. Instead, these approaches adopt the logical
approach of treating things that appear to be similar in a similar fashion.
In so doing, they seek a less ambiguous standard. Although tempting,
this is error. Mere facial similarities do not necessarily reflect similarities
where it matters, and what matters here are the factors delineated by the
public rights doctrine. Approaches that conflate fraudulent conveyances
and preferences are flawed in that they generally fail to apply this basic
justification, established by Stern, Granfinanciera, and Northern
Pipeline. The Court has wed itself to the public rights approach,
particularly when it comes to bankruptcy courts, and there can be little
confidence in predicting the Court's position regarding any particular
bankruptcy proceeding without applying the public rights doctrine.222
219. See, e.g., Steinle v. Trico Real Estate, L.P. (In re CCI Funding ], LLC), No.
09-17437, Adv. No. 10-1418 MER, 2012 WL 3421173, at *6 (Bankr. D. Colo. Aug. 15,
2012) (quoting Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011)).
220. See, e.g., Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618 (quoting Granfinanciera S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 56 (1989)).
221. Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 56 (emphasis added).
222. Some have expressed concern that the Supreme Court has refused to
positively identify proceedings in bankruptcy that would qualify under the public rights
doctrine, raising the specter that there may be no such proceedings. See Brown, supra
note 13, at 222 (quoting Judge Jeffrey R. Hughes, in In re Teleservices Grp., 456 B.R.
318, 323 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2011)). This concern is unnecessary; the more likely
explanation for the Court's reticence is a simple desire to preserve its ability to issue
case-by-case determinations to preserve the Court's ability to respond with flexibility in
permitting the growth of the administrative state while still preserving separation of
powers. See Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 172.
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Application of the public rights doctrine reveals that the differences
between preferences and fraudulent conveyances are sufficient to justify
different constitutional treatment; preferences qualify as public rights,
even if fraudulent conveyances do not. This conclusion is bolstered by
the hesitation expressed by the Court in finding that fraudulent
conveyances should be categorized as private, rather than public
rights,223 and its indication in Stern that a preference action would call
for a different outcome than the result in that case.224 The Court in
Granfinanciera acknowledged the "debate" surrounding this issue,
suggesting that a few slight differences would and are sufficient for
analysis of a similar, but distinct proceeding, to reach a contrary
outcome.225 The Court in Stern contrasted the counterclaim against
preference actions to demonstrate that the counterclaim was not a matter
of public rights. 226 The contrast suggests, and other factors explained
below confirm, that preference actions are public rights.227
C. A Contrast of Preference and Fraudulent Conveyance Law
As noted above, preference law arose largely from the same
concerns that shape the law of fraudulent conveyances, also known as
fraudulent transfers. 28 Both sought to punish the debtor for transfers
made with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud creditors. Accordingly,
such transfers constituted "acts of bankruptcy," and could cost the debtor
a discharge in bankruptcy. 229 As explained above, preference law
developed away from any intent requirements, reflecting the attitude that
the purpose was not to punish an individual creditor, but rather to
achieve equitable distribution among all creditors. 230 As expressed by the
Supreme Court, the primary distinction between a fraudulent conveyance
and a preference is:
223. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55; see also id at 72-73 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("Katchen makes it clear that when Congress does commit the issue and
recovery of a preference to adjudication in a bankruptcy proceeding, the Seventh
Amendment is inapplicable.").
224. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2618 (comparing the preference actions brought in
Katchen and Langenkamp with the claim at issue, noting that "Vickie's claim, in contrast,
is in no way derived from or dependent upon bankruptcy law").
225. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55.
226. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at2618.
227. See id.
228. See supra Part III.A.
229. See Countryman, Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 715-18.
230. See supra Part III.A.
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One is inherently and always vicious; the other innocent and
valid, except when made in violation of the express provisions
of a statute. One is malum per se and the other malum
prohibitum,-and then only to the extent that it is forbidden. A
fraudulent conveyance is void regardless of its date; a
preference is valid unless made within the prohibited period.231
Another difference between the two actions, particularly relevant for
purposes of the public rights exceptions, is that unlike preference law,
the law of fraudulent conveyance was historically applicable outside of
bankruptcy, 23 2 as it still is today. State law regarding fraudulent
conveyances outside of bankruptcy is generally uniform, thanks in large
part to the Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA),2 33 which was
replaced in 1984 with the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (UFTA).234
The UFTA has been adopted by forty-three states, as well as the District
of Columbia.235
The fact that states have laws regarding fraudulent conveyances on
the books is reflected in the Bankruptcy Code. Section 548 of the
Bankruptcy Code, dealing with fraudulent conveyances, provides that the
trustee may avoid any transfer made within the two years prior to the
date of filing with the intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor.236 The
language and wording of the section purposefully mirror the language of
the UFTA,237 with the significant exception that the bankruptcy action
looks back only two years,238 whereas the UFTA has a four year
look-back.239 In practice, the difference in statute of limitations is
immaterial, because the trustee has the power, under Section 544(b)(1),
to avoid transfers pursuant to applicable law,24 ° which means that the
231. Van Iderstine v. Nat'l Discount Co., 227 U.S. 575, 582 (1913); see also
GLENN, supra note 187, at 661-62.
232. See Countryman, Voidable Preference, supra note 186, at 714. For a
thorough history of the origins of the fraudulent conveyance cause of action, see 1
GARRAD GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES 79-99 (rev. ed. 1940).
233. The Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (UFCA) was adopted by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws in 1918. The UFCA was
enacted in twenty-four states and used as a model in many others. WARREN &
WESTBROOK, supra note 194, at 73.
234. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (1984), 7A PT. II U.L.A. 2 (2006)
235. Id at 2-3.
236. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a) (2012).
237. Compare id. with UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 4 (1984), 7a Pt. II
U.L.A. 2, 58-59 (2006).
238. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
239. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 9 (1984), 7A PT. II U.L.A. 2, 194
(2006).
240. 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1).
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trustee can typically take advantage of a state's longer look-back by
bringing the action under that provision of the Bankruptcy Code.
The ability of the trustee to incorporate a state law cause of action is
the most relevant distinction between preference actions and fraudulent
241
conveyance actions for the purposes of the public rights exception.
Courts have generally recognized that private rights are those that most
resemble state law claims, or claims that would have been brought under
the common law, and actions to set aside fraudulent conveyances, with
their frequent and intentional link to state law, are thereby more easily
categorized as private rights.242 However, there is no such link between
state law and preference proceedings. This distinction is crucial for
purposes of analysis under the public rights doctrine.
D. Preferences Are Public Rights
Because the Court has never actually found a bankruptcy
proceeding to be within the category of public rights, there is no template
in the case law for making the case that preferences are public rights. The
case law does not identify the specific characteristics of a public right. It
does, however, explain what prevents qualification as a public right.
Consequently, identifying a public right at this point in the doctrine's
development involves arguing a positive based on the absence of
negative factors, with the limited assistance of some vague guidelines
and generalities that purport to define public rights.
The analysis here draws from Stern's two-pronged approach. In
making the case that the counterclaim at issue did not fall within
Congress's power to bypass Article III, the Court indicated that "the
question is whether the action at issue stems from the bankruptcy itself or
would necessarily be resolved in the claims allowance process., 243 In so
stating, the Court appears to be presenting two mechanisms by which
non-Article III adjudication can be justified, or rather, two manifestations
of the public rights doctrine. As explained below, most preference
241. The two actions have also historically been treated differently in the courts.
See, e.g., McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 22-23 (observing that historically
preference actions were brought in a court of law, whereas fraudulent conveyance actions
were typically brought in a court of equity). But see Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
492 U.S. 33, 48-49 (1989) (indicating that the preference action in Schoenthal v. Irving
Trust Co., 287 U.S. 92 (1932) is "indistinguishable from" the fraudulent conveyance suit
at issue).
242. See Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 55-56.
243. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2618 (2011); see also id at 2611
(distinguishing the debtor's counterclaim from cases that were "federal claims under
bankruptcy law, which would be completely resolved in the bankruptcy process of
allowing or disallowing claims").
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actions satisfy both prongs of the Stern test, accordingly, their final
determination before a non-Article III judge should not be in question.2"
1. PREFERENCES STEM FROM BANKRUPTCY
The public rights test suggested by Stern is satisfied because
preference law stems from the bankruptcy itself, and from no other
source. It is widely acknowledged that preference doctrine is a central
feature of bankruptcy law. 45 As the Supreme Court recently stated, the
authority to avoid preferential transfer "has been a core aspect of the
administration of bankrupt estates since at least the 18th century. '246 In
addition, preference actions, unlike fraudulent conveyance actions,
counterclaims by the estate against creditors, and other similar efforts to
"augment" the estate, are strictly creatures of federal law, established by
Congress in the Bankruptcy Code itself.
Although the Supreme Court has not issued a ruling on the basis of
preference actions' origins in bankruptcy, it has referenced preference
law's close relationship with bankruptcy law by way of counterexample.
The decision in Stern made much of the fact that the debtor's
counterclaim was not established by Congress.247 In finding that the
counterclaim did not fall within "the varied formations of the public
rights exception," the Court noted "[i]t is not a matter that can be pursued
only by grace of the other branches . . . [, i]t does not 'depend[] on the
will of congress'; Congress has nothing to do with it."'248 The Court
further observed that the "claimed right to relief does not flow from a
federal statutory scheme, as in Thomas, or Atlas Roofing. It is not
'completely dependent upon' adjudication of a claim created by federal
law, as in Schor."249 These observations cannot be said for preference
244. See infra Part 1II.D.1-2.
245. Weisberg, supra note 188, at 3 ("[T]he preference, unlike its somewhat
mismatched partner, the fraudulent conveyance, is strictly a creature of bankruptcy law,
rather than a part of nonbankruptcy commercial law that simply receives special
enforcement in the bankruptcy process.").
246. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 372 (2006) ("[T]hose who
crafted the Bankruptcy Clause would have understood it to give Congress the power to
authorize courts to avoid preferential transfers and to recover the transferred property.").
But see Schoenthal, 287 U.S. at 94-95 (observing that under the bankruptcy act of that
time, "[sluits to recover preferences constitute no part of the proceedings in bankruptcy
but concern controversies arising out of it. They may be brought in the state courts as
well as in the bankruptcy courts" (citation omitted)).
247. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2605.
248. Id. at 2614 (quoting Murray v. Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. (In re
Murray's Lessee), 59 U.S. 272, 284 (1855)) (internal citations omitted).
249. Id. (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Commn' v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
856 (1986)) (internal citations omitted).
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actions, which do depend on the will of Congress, and flow entirely and
exclusively from a federal statutory scheme. Indeed, the Court in Stern
used preferences to illustrate the distinction between such "public rights"
types of cases and the "private right" case at issue.
250
In addition, and unlike fraudulent conveyance actions addressed in
Granfinanciera, preference actions are particular to bankruptcy, and have
no ties to state law.251 Preferences are defined by and accordingly
exclusive to bankruptcy cases, a step beyond causes of action that arise
in or out of the bankruptcy filing.252 Like the causes of action in Atlas
Roofing and Thomas, preference laws "do[] not depend on or replace a
right ... under state law.
2 5 3
Further, preference actions are a "'particularized area of law' ', 254
dealing with a specific set of requirements under a strict liability statute.
The Court previously rejected the assertion that counterclaims of the type
asserted by the debtor in Stern fell within the category of public rights
because the authority to determine such counterclaims was "not limited
to a 'particularized area of the law,' as in Crowell, Thomas, and
Schor."255 In contrast, Congress has drafted law regarding preference
actions to create a specific cause of action arising only when the
particularized standards are satisfied.256 Analysis of a preference action
involves a simple application of the standard to the facts; resolution of
preference actions before bankruptcy judges familiar with the standards
and accustomed to their application could well be described as an
"'expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of
fact which are particularly suited to examination and determination by an
administrative agency specially assigned to that task.'
2 57
250. Id. at 2618. In acknowledging that the Court's language here goes against
his argument, Brubaker suggests that this is a "head fake" by the Court. Brubaker, A
"Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 183. My concerns regarding this attitude of refusing
to take the Court at face value are expressed supra Part II.E.
251. See McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 41 ("The contours of
avoidable preferences are peculiarly the subject of bankruptcy law.").
252. See In re Ortiz, 665 F.3d 906, 911-12 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding the
proceedings at issue to be outside the public rights doctrine despite the fact that they
"would have 'no existence outside of the bankruptcy"' and are "'predicated on the
defendants' participation' in the bankruptcy (quoting In re Repository Techs., Inc., 601
F.3d 710, 719-20 (2010))).
253. Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 584 (1985); see
also Atlas Roofing v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm 'n, 430 U.S. 442, 461
(1977).
254. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2613 (quoting Schor, 478 U.S. at 852).
255. Id. at 2615 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458
U.S. 50, 85 (1982)).
256. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 547 (2012).
257. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2615 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 46
(1932)); see also Rafael I. Pardo & Kathryn A. Watts, The Structural Exceptionalism of
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Preference actions are distinct to bankruptcy--created by virtue of
Congress's authority to enact laws of bankruptcy-and are sufficiently
particularized to justify adjudication by a specialized tribunal. Preference
actions stem from the bankruptcy itself; accordingly, they are public
rights. As a public right, it is appropriate and constitutional for Congress
to assign the final adjudication of a preference action to non-Article III
bankruptcy courts. 258
2. PREFERENCE ACTIONS ARE NECESSARILY RESOLVED IN THE CLAIMS
ALLOWANCE PROCESS
Commentators and judges attempting to make sense of the standard
set forth in Stern have frequently taken refuge in the second prong of the
Stern standard to answer questions surrounding Article Ili.259 The second
prong, whether the action is necessarily resolved in the claims allowance
process, may be more conducive to application in any given factual
scenario than the first prong's "stemming" requirement because it
involves a forward-looking prediction of current judicial processes rather
than a backward-looking explanation of an action's origins. As
demonstrated by earlier Court opinions, the origins of an action can be
260the subject of much debate. More to the point, the second prong has
Bankruptcy Administration, 60 UCLA L. REv. 384, 389 (2012) (arguing that bankruptcy
policymaking should be shifted from courts to an administrative agency). But see
McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 41 (arguing that neither preferences nor
fraudulent conveyances are sufficiently specialized to warrant an "extension of the realm
of legislative courts").
258. In ruling on Stern challenges, lower courts have followed a similar rationale
for other types of bankruptcy proceedings. See Miller v. Greenwich Capital Fin. Prods.,
Inc. (In re Am. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc.), 457 B.R. 314, 319-20 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) ("If
not for the bankruptcy, these [equitable subordination] claims would never exist.
Therefore, this Court concludes that is has [constitutional authority to hear and enter a
final judgment on] this adversary proceeding as it directly stems from the bankruptcy
case.").
259. See Sundale, Ltd. v. Fla. Assocs. Capital Enters. LLC, No. 11-20635-CIV,
2012 WL 488110, at *5-6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 14, 2012) (holding that the bankruptcy court
could enter final judgment on the creditor's claim because it would necessarily be
resolved in ruling on the proof of claim) aff'd sub nom. Sundale, Ltd. v. Fla. Assocs.
Capital Enters., LLC (In re Sundale, Ltd.), 499 F. App'x 887 (11th Cir. 2012); In re
Salander O'Reilly Galleries, 453 B.R. 106, 115-18 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) aff'd sub
nom. Kraken Invs. Ltd. v. Jacobs (In re Salander-O'Reilly Galleries, LLC), 475 B.R. 9
(S.D.N.Y. 2012)) ("The thread that binds these cases is the concept that when the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court is at issue, the adjudication of a proof of claim-a
request for payment from the estate-is of paramount concern."); Brubaker, A
"Summary" Theory, supra note 8, at 170-71
260. See McCoid, Right to Jury Trial, supra note 5, at 18 (taking issue with
Justice William Brennan's analysis that a fraudulent conveyance action was historically
1396
Preferences Are Public Rights
been explicitly determinative in Supreme Court precedent, meaning that
the Supreme Court has identified actions necessarily resolved in the
claims allowance process and issued rulings on that basis. This is in
contrast to the Supreme Court's reliance on the first prong, which has
been much less definitive. Unfortunately, as explained below, the
Supreme Court's rulings on the second prong have also muddied the
waters somewhat, and provoked some misinterpretations regarding this
portion of Stern's public rights test.
a. A filedproof of claim-the easy case
It is generally agreed among commentators and jurists alike that a
preference action may be finally adjudicated by a bankruptcy judge when
the creditor-defendant has filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy action,
because it is necessary to determine the preference action to make a final
determination on the proof of claim. This position is well-supported in
the Court's jurisprudence. Two cases in particular are informative on this
point.
The first is Katchen v. Landy,26' a case pre-dating the modem
Bankruptcy Code, in which the Court considered the jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy referee over a voidable preference action.262 At that time, the
summary/plenary distinction still applied; the bankruptcy judge only had
summary jurisdiction, or the authority to enter final orders, over
"'controversies relating to property over which [the courts] have actual
or constructive possession. ,,263 The creditor argued that, because
preference actions were considered plenary when the preferred creditor
had not filed a claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, the situation should
be the same when the creditor's filed claim is contested by the trustee.
264
The Court disagreed, finding that, although the Bankruptcy Act had
not expressly conferred summary jurisdiction to claims to surrender
preferences, it had conferred the express power to allow or disallow
claims. 265 Recognizing this authority, the Court further observed that
"[u]navoidably and by the very terms of the [Bankruptcy] Act, when a
bankruptcy trustee presents [an objection to a claim based on the
existence of a preference], the claim can neither be allowed nor
established at law, and arguing instead that such an action "was grounded in a historical
option to pursue [a fraudulent conveyance] in equity").
261. 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
262. Id. at 325.
263. Id. at 327 (quoting Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478,
481 (1940)).
264. Id. at 327-28.
265. Id. at 328-30.
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disallowed until the preference matter is adjudicated., 266 Accordingly,
the preference action is "part and parcel of the allowance process and is
subject to summary adjudication by a bankruptcy court., 26 7 As explained
by the Court in Stern, "this Court concluded that summary adjudication
in bankruptcy was appropriate, because it was not possible for the referee
to rule on the creditor's proof of claim without first resolving the
voidable preference issue. 2 68 The Court then declined to say whether
summary jurisdiction would have existed had "'all of the substantial
factual and legal bases"' for the preference action not been disposed of in
ruling on the creditor's claims.269 In other words, while the Court deemed
summary jurisdiction appropriate when a creditor filed a proof of claim,
it did not foreclose whether jurisdiction would have been appropriate had
the creditor not filed a proof of claim, either in Katchen or more recently
in Stern.
Several decades after Katchen, the Court was confronted by another
challenge to preference procedure, this time brought under the Seventh
Amendment by preferred creditors who argued that they were entitled to
a jury trial in avoidance proceedings.27 ° In a per curiam opinion issued in
the case Langenkamp v. Culp,271 the Court drew on its ruling in
Granfinanciera to hold that "filing a claim against a bankruptcy estate
... triggers the process of 'allowance and disallowance of claims,'
thereby subjecting [the creditor] to the bankruptcy court's equitable
power. '2 72 "In other words," the Court explained, "the creditor's claim
and the ensuing preference action by the trustee become integral to the
restructuring of the debtor-creditor relationship .... ,273 Accordingly, the
defendants were not entitled to a jury trial on the alleged preference.274
Following the Supreme Court's lead in Stern, commentators have
conflated the public rights analysis involved in Seventh Amendment
challenges and Article III challenges, reading Langenkamp as support for
the conclusion that the bankruptcy court may issue a final determination
in cases where the defendant/creditor has filed a proof of claim. 275
266. Id. at 330.
267. Id.
268. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616 (2011).
269. Id. at 2616-17 (quoting Katchen, 382 U.S. at 332 n. 9).
270. Langenkamp v. Culp, 498 U.S. 42, 42-43 (1990).
271. 498 U.S. 42 (1990).
272. Id. at 44 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58
(1989)).
273. Id. at 44.
274. Id. at 45.
275. See, e.g., Brubaker, Bleak House, supra note 63, at 17; Gibson, supra note
206, at 166-68, 167 n.165; Christopher S. Lockman, Esq., Makaliduhg's Post: How Stem
v. Marshall Is Shaking Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction to Its Core, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 125,
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b. A filed proof of claim-the misinterpretation
Unfortunately, many commentators have also been misled or even
seduced by the ease of the proof of claim analysis, arguing that the
presence of a filed proof of claim is a necessary element to non-Article
III final adjudication, rather than just a factor in the broader public rights
analysis.276 This flawed application of Stern stems in part from language
found in Langenkamp. In dicta, the Court had proposed that "[i]f a party
does not submit a claim against the bankruptcy estate, [... that party] is
entitled to a jury trial, 277 suggesting that the real issue is not the public
rights doctrine at all, but merely whether or not the creditor filed a
claim.278 The Court has previously held as much in the context of another
Seventh Amendment challenge.279
In light of the similarities between the jury trial and Article III
analyses, some have concluded that unless a creditor has filed a proof of
claim, preference actions fall outside the category of actions appropriate
for a non-Article III court's final adjudication.2 80 Alec Ostrow, for
example, has argued that the only justification for core jurisdiction by a
non-Article III court in preference proceedings is voluntary waiver of the
right to Article III adjudication by the participants in the case, as
demonstrated by the filing of a proof of claim.
281
This reasoning is flawed in at least four respects. First, it relies
heavily on the idea that fraudulent conveyance actions and preference
actions are indistinguishable for purposes of the public rights analysis,
150 (2012) ("While the analysis in both Granfinanciera and Langenkamp was couched in
terms of a jury trial right and not Article III judicial power, the Supreme Court has on
several occasions equated the analysis between the two. As a consequence, many courts
have concluded that by waiving a right to a jury trial through filing a claim, creditors
were also waiving their rights to be heard by an Article III tribunal." (internal footnotes
omitted)); Miller, supra note 209, at 2.
276. See, e.g., Crist, supra note 2, at 633; Ostrow, supra note 87, at 112.
277. Langenkamp, 498 U.S. at 45.
278. West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy LP),
465 B.R. 452, 455-56 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) ("If the Seventh Amendment question
requires the same answer as the Article III question, the Schoenthal/Katchen
Langenkamp line of cases implies that preference actions may not be public rights
disputes.").
279. Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 58 (1989) ("We read
Schoenthal and Katchen as holding that, under the Seventh Amendment, a creditor's right
to a jury trial on a bankruptcy trustee's preference claim depends upon whether the
creditor has submitted a claim against the estate ....").
280. Ostrow, supra note 87, at 117; see also Tabor v. Kelly (In re Davis), No.
05-15794-GWE, Adv. No. 07-05181-L, 2011 WL 5429095, at *12 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn.
Oct. 5, 2011) (finding that the court could not issue a final ruling in the debtor's
preference and fraudulent conveyance actions because the defendant had not filed a proof
of claim).
281. Ostrow, supra note 87, at 117.
2013:1355 1399
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
and second, that the analysis regarding jury trials can be overlaid on
questions regarding Article III, making Granfinanciera controlling
precedent. For reasons explained above, the first assertion is simply
incorrect 82 and the second lacks a strong justification. 283 Third, it places
undue emphasis on the proof of claim, using this approach as an
alternative to the public rights doctrine.284 Rather than conducting a full
analysis of the public rights doctrine, this approach relies instead on a
quick factual determination-was there a claim filed by the creditor?
Fourth, it misunderstands the nature of preference proceedings and
claims determination, supposing that there is a temporal requirement that
the claim must be filed before the preference action is heard in order for
the preference action to have an impact on the claim.285 Bankruptcy
practice suggests that no such temporal requirement exists.
The consequence of these errors is twofold. First, proponents of this
approach skip an analysis of preference actions under the public rights
doctrine altogether, opting for a "proof of claim" shortcut instead of the
methodology adopted by the Supreme Court. Second, in applying this
shortcut, proponents assume that it may only be satisfied when the
creditor/defendant of a preference proceeding has previously filed a
claim against the estate. This assumption is incorrect both as a doctrinal
matter, when looking at modem Supreme Court cases, and as a practical
matter because bankruptcy practice must regularly cope with allowed
claims and preference proceedings that do not follow a consistent
temporal order.286
c. Countering the proof of claim shortcut
The shortcut described above, which has been embraced by Ostrow
and others, reflects an inappropriate application of Supreme Court
precedent and a flawed interpretation of bankruptcy law. First, the ruling
in Stern indicates that the mere filing of a claim is not a dispositive
factor; under a complete public rights analysis, both prongs are relevant
and require examination. 87 By virtue of the two-pronged approach, final
282. See discussion supra Part III.C.
283. See discussion supra note 21.
284. See discussion infra Part III.D.3.
285. See id.
286. See infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
287. Despite critics' reliance on the preference cases discussed above, nothing in
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence contradicts this conclusion. In Katchen, for example,
the Court declined to say whether summary jurisdiction, or the issuing of a final order by
the bankruptcy referee, would have been appropriate even if "all of the substantial factual
and legal bases" had not been disposed of in ruling on the creditor's claims, a point the
Stern Court emphasized. Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2616-17 (2011) (quoting
Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 332 n.9 (1966)).
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orders may be issued in preference actions by a non-Article III judge
even if the preference actions are not finally resolved in ruling on the
creditor's claims, simply because they are public rights themselves.288
Second, justifying the proof of claim approach outside the context
of the second prong on the grounds that it demonstrates the creditor's
intent to waive his right to an Article III court289 is problematic because it
presupposes that the right is subject to waiver. This issue is heavily
disputed and the subject of an outstanding petition to the Supreme
Court.290 Further, the Court's decision in Stern held that the mere filing
of a proof of claim by the defendant in that case was not sufficient to
permit the bankruptcy court to issue a final ruling when it was not
necessary to determine the cause of action in order to resolve the
claim.291 This indicates that the filing of a proof of claim either does not
constitute waiver, or that waiver of a personal right is insufficient to
justify final determination by a non-Article III court.292 There is no
reason to think that this ruling in Stern is not equally applicable to other
core proceedings, like preferences or fraudulent conveyances, which face
a challenge under Article III.
Third, preference actions may be deemed "necessarily resolved in
the claims allowance process" even if they are not preceded by a
creditor's proof of claim. The recovery of a "true" preference, true in that
it is not actually a fraudulent conveyance, necessarily creates an
allowable claim against the estate. This is because a preference, rather
than a fraudulent conveyance, is given on account of a legitimate debt.
288. This conclusion is also consistent with Stern's suggestion that its holding
was a narrow one, which at least one court has interpreted to mean that "most
fundamental bankruptcy matters must fall within bankruptcy courts' constitutional
authority." West v. Freedom Med, Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy LP),
465 B.R. 452,458 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011).
289. See Ostrow, supra note 87, at 109.
290. See discussion supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
291. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2616-17. In rejecting this argument, the Court again
runs through considerations pertinent to the public rights exception, namely, that the right
at interest was created under state law, and that the claim against the estate was
unaffected by the counterclaim. Id. at 2611-13; see also Brubaker, A "Summary" Theory,
supra note 8, at 163 (noting that the majority of the Court in Stern rejected the inference
that the creditor's proof of claim reflected consent sufficient to authorize the bankruptcy
court to determine the counterclaim against him).
292. For more on the issue of consent to jurisdiction, see Masterson, supra note
25, at 109-10 (noting that where there are non-exempt assets, a creditor's decision to file
a proof of claim or not is really a Hobson's choice, because failure to file a proof of claim
will mean foregoing any hope of collecting from the debtor); see also Miller, supra note
209, at 11 ("Because a creditor filing a proof of claim in bankruptcy cannot choose to
pursue the debt elsewhere, both Granfinanciera and Stern rejected [the notion] that filing




As it is currently constructed, the preference requires no fraud,
misappropriation, or even ill-will in its grant or its acceptance.
Accordingly, creditors who have received a preference that is then
avoided will always have an enforceable claim against the estate on
account of the underlying debt, at least in the amount of the avoided
preference, if not greater.293
Finally, the view that preference actions are only necessarily
resolved in the claims process if a proof of claim was filed prior to the
preference action is contrary to modem bankruptcy practice. The view
seeks to force the claims process into a rigid temporal sequence, when in
reality cases often advance on a much more circuitous route. Because of
differing deadlines for the submission of claims 294 and the filing of
preferences proceedings, 95 preference actions may continue to be
brought long after claims have been filed. But then, once a preference
action has been determined, new claims may be filed as a consequence of
the creditor's newly reinstated debt.296 Bankruptcy courts are repeatedly
called upon to manage this fluctuating system as part of the claims
resolution process.
For example, it is not altogether uncommon for the trustee in a
chapter 11 case to bring a preference action after the plan has already
been voted on and confirmed. In such cases, preference defendants who
have allowed claims under the plan have sought to have the preference
action disallowed on the basis that the trustee failed to raise the
preference as a defense to their claims.297 Under the rigid temporal view
of the process of determining claims, such an action would be
disallowed, because it failed to raise objections to the claims prior to
their allowance under the confirmed chapter 11 plan. However, the
293. See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b) (2012).
294. Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002(c), a timely proof
of claim must be filed not later than ninety days after the first date set for the meeting of
creditors under 11 U.S.C. § 341(a). FED. R. BA'NKR. P. 3002(c). This § 341(a) meeting
must be scheduled by the trustee "[w]ithin a reasonable time after the order for relief' in
a bankruptcy filing. 11 U.S.C. § 34 1(a). Although it does not overcome this standard of
reasonableness, the Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2003(a) indicates that the
trustee shall call the § 341(a) meeting between twenty and forty days following the order
for relief. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2003(a). But see Scroggins v. BP Exploration & Oil, Inc. (In
re Brown Transp. Truckload, Inc.), 161 B.R. 735, 738 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1993) (finding
an initial creditor's meeting scheduled for seven months after the filing was within a
"reasonable time" and the Bankruptcy Rule requiring an earlier creditors meeting was
void).
295. Pursuant to II U.S.C. § 546 of the Bankruptcy Code, the estate trustee may
not commence an avoidance action more than one year after his appointment or two years
after the order for relief, whichever is later. 11 U.S.C. § 546(a)(1).
296. Id. § 502(h); see also id. § 550(a).
297. See id. § 502(d) (disallowing claims from any entity from which property is
recoverable as a preference).
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majority view among the courts is that such an action may continue,
based on a close reading of the applicable statute and the reality that
smooth administration of a reorganization may require that preferences
are only attended to after a plan is in place.298 Accordingly, preferences
remain closely intertwined with the claims allowance process, despite the
time frame in which those claims are brought and allowed. When
analyzing the link between preferences and the claims allowance process,
it should not matter whether those claims were filed prior to the
preference action or arose by virtue of the preference action itself.
299
In conclusion, the appropriate test for preference actions is the
public rights test laid out in Stern, a two pronged approach, with each
prong intended to reach cases consistent with the justification for the
public rights exception to Article III determination. Under this
two-pronged approach, preference actions are decidedly matters of
public rights-both because they stem from bankruptcy law itself as the
creation of exclusively federal law,300 and because they are necessary to
resolve claims of creditors against the estate.30 1  Concerns that
298. See Gold v. Eccleston (In re Dornier Aviation (N. Am.), Inc.), 320 B.R. 831,
837 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("Nowhere does the plain language of the statute provide or even
suggest a corollary right of creditors to dispute avoidance actions on the basis of
previously settled claims."); Shurn v. Gilbert (In re Gulf Coast Glass & Erection Co.),
484 B.R. 685, 695 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2013) (noting practical considerations to delay a
preference action until after plan confirmation); TWA Inc. v. S.F. Airports Comm 'n (In re
TWA Inc. Post Confirmation Estate), 305 B.R. 221, 227 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004) ("1 have
experienced a number of large chapter 11 cases where the plan confirmation process
turned on the resolution of a number of large claims. This dictates the need for a claims
resolution process occurring long before any preference analysis is undertaken."). But see
LaRoche Indus. v. Gen. Am. Transp. Corp. (In re La Roche Indus.), 284 B.R. 406,
408-09 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (holding that 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) "stands for the
proposition that if a claim is allowed there is no longer a voidable transfer due from that
claimant" and that a voidable transfer "must be determined, as part of the claims process
and not at a later time") abrogated by Caliolo v. Saginaw Bay Plastics, Inc. (In re
Cambridge Indus. Holdings), No 00-1919, 2006 WL 516764 (D. Del. Mar. 2, 2006).
299. This view of preferences is further supported by the Supreme Court's recent
holding in Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 369-72 (2006) (describing
preference actions as in rem proceedings "premised on the debtor and his estate, and not
on the creditors" (quoting Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440, 447
(2004)). See also West v. Freedom Med., Inc. (In re Apex Long Term Acute Care-Katy
LP), 465 B.R. 452, 457 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) ("Granfinanciera, Katchen,
Langenkamp, and Schoenthal, taken together, imply that § 547 claims fall outside the
public rights doctrine. But Katz-the most recent pronouncement-weighs heavily in the
other direction.").
300. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2612 ("The point of Murray's
Lessee was simply that Congress may set the terms of adjudicating a suit when the suit
could not otherwise proceed at all.").
301. See In re Apex, 465 B.R. at 463 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2011) ("The Court
concludes that preference actions both stem from the bankruptcy itself and are decided
primarily pursuant to in rem jurisdiction. The cause of action for preferential transfers is
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preferences do not fall under this category appear to be rooted in the
mistaken belief that preferences and fraudulent conveyances are
indistinguishable, or should be treated as such for the purposes of
analysis under the public rights exception, and a corresponding
misinterpretation of Supreme Court jurisprudence.3 °2
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Stern, the
procedural mechanism by which preference actions are determined,
typically through the statutorily "core" jurisdiction of a non-Article III
bankruptcy judge, has proved to the be the subject of controversy. In the
post-Stern scramble to interpret the decision and predict the future
implications, some have concluded that preference actions must lie
outside a non-Article III court's authority to issue final determinations.
This conclusion is incorrect, as demonstrated by a careful look at the
Supreme Court's ruling in Stern and an analysis of previous
jurisprudence on the issue of the public rights doctrine and preference
actions. The public rights doctrine, under which final determination by a
non-Article III court is authorized under the Constitution, is alive and
well, and dispositive30 3 regarding the bankruptcy courts' scope of
authority with respect to preference actions. Preference actions both stem
from the bankruptcy itself and are necessary for a final determination of
established by the Bankruptcy Code.") The majority of courts who have considered the
matter appear to have reached a similar conclusion. See Crist, supra note 2, at 663-66.
302. Concerns of this type may be partially rooted in the fact that preference
actions, like fraudulent conveyance actions, are discretionary, meaning that a trustee may
choose to bring such an action or not, according to the strategic demands of the situation.
Under this procedural setup, such actions appear less "public rights," established by
Congress and involving the government as a party, and more "private rights," actions
brought by one individual against another. Although the presence of two private parties
has not proved fatal to all determinations of "public rights," see supra notes 163-64 and
accompanying text, it would seem the "gold standard" of public rights would not permit
such a discretionary scheme. A simple solution may be to make preference actions
mandatory, resembling more the automatic stay than the fraudulent conveyance. Such an
alteration to the system would introduce other advantages, primarily greater legitimacy in
the eyes of creditors. An in-depth evaluation of this proposal is outside the scope of this
paper.
303. There may be a lingering debate that, despite Stern's attachment to the
Northern Pipeline approach, Schor has not been overturned; accordingly, a balancing test
may be more appropriate to determine whether a proceeding must be finally determined
by an Article III court. To the extent that Schor's balancing test will be held relevant to
an inquiry regarding bankruptcy proceedings, it remains likely that preference
proceedings would fall within the bankruptcy court's proper jurisprudence, given the
generous nature of the test. See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S.
833, 853 (1986).
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claims against the bankruptcy estate. Accordingly, they satisfy the test of
public rights set forth by the Supreme Court in Stern.
* * *
